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INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
REPORT
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
EIGHTY-SECOND CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
PURSUANT TO
S. Res. 366
(81st Congress) —
A RESOLUTION RELATING TO THE INTERNAL SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES
HEARINGS HELD JULY 25, 1951-JUNE 20, 1952 BY THE INTERNAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE
July 2 (legislative day June 27), 1952. — Ordered to be printed
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 21705 WASHINGTON : 1952 t?
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U. S. SUPERINTENDENT OF DOCUMENT
AUG 11 1952
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
PAT McCARRAN, Nevada, Chairman
HARLEY M. KILGORE, West Virginia ALEXANDER WILEY, Wisconsin
JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi WILLIAM LANGER, Nortli Dakota
WARREN G. MAGNUSON, Washington HOMER FERGUSON, Michigan
HERBERT R. O'CONOR, Maryland WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana
ESTES KEFAUVER, Tennessee ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utah
WILLIS SMITH, North Carolina ROBERT C. HENDRICKSON, New Jersey
J. G. SorRwiNE, Counsel
Internal Security Subcommittee
PAT McCARRAN, Nevada, Chairman JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi HOMER FERGUSON, Michigan
HERBERT R. O'CONOR, Maryland WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana
WILLIS SMITH, North Carolina ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utah
Robert Morris, Special Counsel Benjamin' Mandel, Director of Research
Subcommittee Investigating the Institute of Pacific Relations JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman PAT McCARRAN, Nevada HOMER FERGUSON, Michigan
II
CONTENTS
Page
Introduction 1
What is IPR? 3
Effect of the Inscitute of Pacific Relations on United States public opinion. _ 63
Communist influence in the IPR : 120
Effect of the Institute of Pacific Relations upon United States foreign
policy 178
Conclusions 223
Recommendations 225
Note. — References in this report have been keyed to the text of the hearings either by page or exhibit number.
Ill
82d Congress ) SENATE ( Report
U Session | ( No. 2050
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
July 2 (legislative day, June 27), 1952. — Ordered to be printed
Mr. McCarran, from the Committee on the Judiciar}", submitted the
following
REPORT
[Pursuant to S. Res. 366, 81st Cong., 2d sess.]
INTRODUCTION
The Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Com- mittee was empowered on December 21, 1950, under the terms of Senate Resolution 366 of the Eighty-first Congress, to make a com- plete and continuing study and investigation of —
(1) The admmistration, operation, and enforcement of the Internal Security Act of 1950;
(2) The administration, operation and enforcement of other laws relating to espionage, sabotage, and the protection of the internal security of the United States; and
(3) The extent, nature and effects of subversive activities in the United States; its territories and possessions, including, but not limited to espionage, sabotage, and infiltration by persons who are or may be under the domination of the foreign government or organizations controlling the world Communist movement or any other movement seeking to overthrow the Government of the United States by force and violence.
This authority subsequently was extended under Senate Resolution 7 of the Eighty-second Congress, until January 31, 1952.^ Section 2 of the Senate Resolution 7 is as follows:
The committee, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof, is authorized to sit and act at such places and times during the sessions, recesses, and adjourned periods of the Senate, to hold such hearings, to require by subpoenas or otherwise the attendance of such witnesses and the production of such boolvs, papers, and dociunents, to administer such oaths, to take such testimony, to procure such printing and binding, and, within the amount appropriated therefor, to make such expenditures as it deems advisable. * * * Subpoenas shall be issued by
1 And by S. Res. 198, S. Res. 314.
2 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
the chairman of the committee or the subcommittee, and may be served by an person designated by such chairman.
Acting on this authority, the subcommittee took possession of certain back files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, which were found on the Lee, Mass., farm of E. C. Carter, a trustee. The con- tents of these files became the preliminary basis for the committee's investigation. They were studied for 5 months before the first witness took the stand.
Ultimately, the committee took public testimony from 66 witnesses. Twenty-eight of these had had some connection with IPR, according to a compilation prepared by the subcommittee staff. Two had helped found the Institute (p. 3850, exhibit 1382). Two had filled the post of secretary-general (p. 6, 1150). Four had occupied the executive secretaryship of IPR's American Coimcil (pp. 6, 80, 937, 2644). Thirteen were or had been trustees (pp. 264, 568, 713, 1313, 3969). Four had served in editorial capacities. Others were writers, research associates, and staff members.
The great majority of these IPR witnesses may be classified as defenders of the Institute. Some appeared at their own instance. Some presented voluminous statements, which were accepted into the record by the subcommittee.
Other witnesses included a former Vice President of the United States (p. 1297ff.), a former American Ambassador to the U. S. S. R. (p. 452 Iff.), former Chief of Intelligence of the Far Eastern Com- mand of the United States and the United Nations forces (p. 353), two former high officials of the Soviet Government (pp. 183, 4479), the director of a special investigation bureau of the Japanese Govern- ment (p. 499), the former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, the wartime Chief of Staff to Admiral King, Admiral Charles M. Cooke (p. 1491ft'), and a number of State Department officials who had participated in America's far eastern affairs (pp. 703, 704, 1686, 1687).
In addition, the staff examined about 20,000 documents, including books, magazine articles, letters, memoranda, minutes, reports, and some supplementary publications from Government sources. Approxi- mately 2,000 of these documents were put into the record as exhibits, to aid the subcommittee in reaching its conclusion. The object of this investigation was to determine —
(a) Whether or to what extent the Institute of Pacific Rela- tions was infiltrated and influenced or controlled by agents of the communist world conspiracy;
(6) Whether or to what extent these agents and their dupes worked through the Institute into the United States Govern- ment to the point where the}^ exerted an influence on United States far eastern policy; and if so, whether and to what extent they still exert such influence;
(c) Whether or to what extent these agents and their dupes led or misled American public opinion, particularly with respect to far eastern policy. Hearings began July 25, 1951. They ended June 20, 1952. The printed record of hearings totals over 5,000 pages.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
WHAT IS IPR?
When W. L. Holland appeared before the Subcommittee on Internal Security, he declared :
I am speaking as the executive officer of both the international IPR and the American IPR, and as a person who lias been closely connected with the institute's work and staff for a very long period (p. 1212).
Mr. Holland then gave the subcommittee this description of the institute:
The Institute of Pacific Relations is an association composed of national councils in 10 countries. Each national council is autonomous and carries on its own work in its own distinctive way. Together they cooperate in an international IPR program of research, publications, and conferences. This program is directed by a Pacific Council in which each national council is represented, and administered by a small international secretariat working in New York under the direction of the Pacific Council.
The institute at present consists of the following independent national councils:
American Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc.
Australian Institute of International Affairs
Canadian Institute of International Affairs
Comitg d' Etudes des Problemes du Pacifique (France)
Indian Council of World Affairs
Japan Institute of Pacific Relations
New Zealand Institute of International Affairs
Pakistan Institute of International Affairs
Philippine Council, Institute of Pacific Relations
Ro.val Institute of International Affairs (Great Britain) The institute was founded in 1925 at a conference in Honolulu of religious leaders, scholars, and businessmen from various countries of the Pacific area, who, even then, realized the need for greater knowledge and frank discussion of the problems of Asia and the relations of Asia and the West. The impetus came in part from leaders of the YMCA.
At the first conference it was realized that intelligent discussion was impossible on many subjects because many basic facts were lacking about the peoples, re- sources, trade, and pohtics of tlie Pacific area. This led to the inauguration by the international IPR of a large and continuing research program which subse- quently received generous support from the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Corp. The IPR has played an important part in increasing available knowledge about Asia in the United States and other countries (p. 1215). *******
The work of the international Institute of Pacific Relations is financed prin- cipallv bv contributions from its national councils and bv grants from foundations. In the 2'6 years from 1925 through 1950 total receipts amounted to $2,569,000, an average of about $100,000 a year. Of this total, 48 percent came from the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Corp., 40 percent from the national councils, 9 percent from sales of publications, and 3 percent from miscellaneous sources. The American IPR contributed 29 percent of the total receipts, the British and Canadian national councils 3 percent each, the China council 2 percent, and the Japanese council 1 percent: the eight other national councils each con- tributed less than 1 percent. Thus United States sources, including foundations, supplied 77 percent of the organization's income. If grants to the American IPR are included, the contribution of the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie
4 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Corp. to the work of the IPR through 1950 totals $2,176,000. In 1950 the Rockefeller Foundation voted a new grant of $50,000 to the international institute and $60,000 to the American IPR.
The American Institute of Pacific Relations derives its funds from membership subscriptions, gifts from individuals and corporations, and grants from founda- tions. From 1925 through 1950 its total net income was $2,536,000, of which 50 percent came from foundations (chiefly the Rockefeller Foundation, Carnegie Corp. and Carnegie Endowment), 33 percent from individual .-and corporate con- tributions, 12 percent from sales of publications, and 5 percent from miscellaneous sources. Leading contributors to the American IPR today include the Standard- Vacuum Oil Co., International General Electric Co., National City Bank, Chase National Bank, Bankers Trust Co., International Business Machines Corp., International Telephone & Telegraph Co., Electric Bond & Share Co., and the Rockefeller Bros. Fund. Lever Bros. (London) is a major contributor to the international IPR.
Among other large corporate contributors have been Alexander & Baldwin, American Trust Co., Castle & Cooke, Time, Inc., J. P. Morgan, Studebaker Corp., Reader's Digest, American President Lines, Matson Steamship Co., Bank of Hawaii, Pan American Airways, Bank of America, Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., Shell Oil Co., National Cash Register, Wilbur Ellis Co., Bank of Cahfornia, American Foreign Power Co.
Major individual contributors to the IPR have included the late Frank C. Atherton, Juan Trippe, Henry R. Luce, Jerome D. Greene, Mrs. Thomas W. Lament, the late Joseph P. Chamberlain, Mrs. Frances Bolton, Joseph E. Davies, Mrs. Wallace Alexander, Mrs. Frank Gerbode, Arthur H. Dean, and Gerard Swope (p. 1217).
No witness, nor any document in the record, disputed that part of Mr. Holland's testimony cited above.
Mr. Holland further characterized the institute thus:
(1) The institute is an international organization.
(2) It is a nonpartisan organization.
(3) It has never tried to influence the actions of governments.
(4) The character of its work has been determined not by Communists, but by the hundreds of eminent citizens and scholars who have taken an active part in the institute as officers of the organization, as delegates to its conferences, or as writers of books and articles which it has published (p. 1215).
Additional IPE. spokesmen supported this latter statement (p. 3849 ^.t seq.; p. 3862 et seq.). The statement was fundamentally challenged, however, by the testimony of other witnesses, including some former officers of the organization itself. Raymond Dennett, present director of the World Peace Foundation and once secretary of IPR's American Council, said this:
I do not think it was an objective research organization (p. 966).
Prof. Kenneth Colegrove of Northwestern University, who joined the Institute "in the early thirties," said this:
Behind the front, the Institute of Pacific Relations was nothing else than a propaganda organization supporting a (Communist) line (p. 916).
Prof. "William M. McGovern, also of N orthAvestern University, asserted that he found "very clear evidence" that IPR's international quarterly. Pacific Affairs, was "trying to advocate the Stalinist ap- proach" (p. 1013). Prof. David N. Rowe of Yale University charac- terized Pacific Affairs' editor, Owen Lattimore, as follows:
Within the field of far eastern studies, Asiatic studies, and particularly of Chinese studies, * * * j consider him principal agent for the advocacy of Stalinist ideas (p. 3985).
Professor Rowe added that IPR's claim of "no propaganda, no point of view" was "completely irreconcilable with what happened" at an IPR international conference he had attended (p. 3974). Louis
INSTITUTE OF PAaFIC RELATIONS 5
Biidenz, presently assistant professor at Fordham University, and former member of the American Com,mimist Politburo, said he had heard IPR described in a Polibiiro meeting as "the Little Red School- house for teaching certain people in Washington how to think with the Soviet Union in the Far East" (p. 517).
Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby, chief of intelligence for the Far East and United Nations Command, declared "the conclusion could be arrived at" that the Japanese branch of IPR was "used as a spy ring for Russian Communists and the Russian Red Army" (p. 364). Alexander Barmine, chief of the Russian unit in the State Department's Voice of America and former brigadier general of the Red Army, said he had been told by Soviet intelligence officers that IPR was "a cover shop for military mtelligence work in the Pacific area" (p. 202). Igor Bogolepov, another refugee from Red tjTanny who was once counselor of the Soviet Foreign Office, gave the following testimony:
* * * As one of my former comrades expressed it, it (the IPR) is like a double-way track. On one line you get information from America through this institute. On the other hand, you send information which you would like to implant in American brains through the same channel of the institute. * * *
Mr. Morris. When you talk about two-way track, do you mean that military inteUigence was extracted from outside the Soviet Union through the medium of the Institute of Pacific Relations?
Mr. Bogolepov. That is right.
Mr. Morris. And on the other hand, by the out- way track you mean informa- tion that you wanted to impart to the outside world was transmitted through that medium?
Mr. Bogolepov. Yes (p. 4491).
Senator Eastland. Propaganda, you mean. Soviet propaganda that the Foreign Office desired implanted in foreign minds would be sent through the facilities of the Institute of Pacific Relations. That is what you mean?
Mr. Bogolepov. That is mostly propaganda, but I would say even a little more than propaganda, because not only organizational propaganda but even the organization of a network of fellow travelers in your and other countries (p. 4492).
Mr. Morris. Did you know that the Soviet organization used the Institute of Pacific Relations to collect information not only in the United States but on other countries, such as Japan and China?
Mr. Bogolepov. It was my impression that, at that time — I mean before the war — when I was in the Soviet Union, the Soviet intelligence was more interested not in the United States of America, but in Japan and other countries which were in direct conflict with the Soviet Union. It was also my impression that the Institute of Pacific Relations was merely used by Soviet intelligence in order to get, via America, the information on Japan and China and Great Britain (p. 4590).
Which of these descriptions of the Institute of Pacific Relations are the true ones?
This was the fundamental question to which the subcommittee ad- dressed itself. In seeking the answer, it weighed the testimony of 66 witnesses, and studied the contents of approximately 20,000 docu- ments, including letters, memoranda, pamphlets, magazine articles, and books.
STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN
The subcommittee's open hearings began July 25, 1951, with the following statem.ent by the chairman:
One of the lines of inquiry undertaken by the Internal Security Subcommittee concerned the extent to which subversive forces may have influenced or sought to influence the formulation and execution of our far eastern policy.
6 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
In this connection, the committee, acting on advice that certain files of the Institute of Pacific Relations had been removed to a barn in Lee, Mass., and that these files contained information bearing on matters of concern to the committee, took possession of the files in ciuestion, under subpena, and relegated to its staff, under cloFe supervision, the lengthy and arduous task of sifting those files.
The committee was aware, at the time, of the fact that the board of trustees of the institute had been studded with personalities of such respectability, and of such preeminence of capitalistic achievement, that the very presence of their names on a letterhead might have put at rest all suspicion of intrigue or sub- versive influence. The committee was also aware of the possibility that this aggregation of prominent individuals may have lieen used as a facade for Com- munists operating shrewdly behind the scenes. It has been done before. The committee knew that it is not possil)le to identify a Communist by his appearance or by his attire or by his station in life, or even by the size of his bank account. The committee's staff was instructed to maintain, and the committee sought to maintain, a high standard of evidence, and to proceed with a truly objective approach. The committee did not want first impressions. It wanted facts.
It is virtually impossible to define fully and accurately, in the al)stract, the components of disloyalty or subversion. The inner currents of the human mind are at best difficult to gage. Motives are often so obscure that sometimes one does not fully comprehend his own impelling urges, and may completely mis- judge the motives of an associate. Successful conspirators usually are consum- mate dissemblers; and thus the acts of such persons are often shrouded in the darkness of stealth, accompanied by acts of misdirection, or clouded by am- biguity of meaning.
The measurement of men's motives, the assessment of the strands of thought, and the elements of pressures which may have influenced another's behavior, is not a task to be sought. And yet if we are to do our full part to save our country and our way of life from subversion and erosion, we must make the effort. But we must withhold our judgment in all respects until the proper time. We must first make the record, so that the facts will be known.
In such an investigation as this, where a possible conspiracy is being examined, very often the only evidence obtainable derives from persons who once participated in the conspiracy. Only eyes that witnessed the deeds, and ears that heard the words of intrigue can attest thereto. Thus, ex-Communists, and agents of the Government who posed as Communists, often are the only sources of evidence of what transpired behind doors closed to the non-Communist world. Govern- ment agencies do not readily yield up their concealed agents. Fortunately, it is possible to verify the loyalty of an ex-Communist, in large part, by the very extent of his willingness to give full- and frank testimony against the Communist Party. Many ex-Communists have labored loyally and valiantly to expose the intrigues of their former associates. They often have no illusions about the Communist Party and its purposes, and have developed antibodies against further infection.
"Once a Communist, always a Communist" has become, in effect, a Communist slogan; but no one who professes to comprehend the significance of transgression and repentance, of wrongdoing and contrition, can subscribe to such a shibboleth. These facts must be borne in mind as, later in these hearings, the testimony of ex-Communists is used to supplement the evidence found in the files.
It should 1)6 made clear that the committee was mindful at the outset that we had under subpena only some of the files of the institute, and that we might for that reason run the risk of getting a distorted view of the workings of the organi- zation. We, therefore, extended our subpena and brought all the records of the institute under our scrutiny. We have, further, repeatedly asked the secretary general of the institute to be sure that everything that should be seen by us is made available to us.
The press and the pulilic, as well as the committee, should bear in mind that the mere fact that a person is shown during the course of these hearings to have been associated with the Institute of Pacific Relations or to have been mentioned in certain letters which may be placed in evidence should give rise to no conclu- sions. Each bit of documentary evidence will speak with its own voice, but no such evidence should be weighed alone and without reference to the whole body of evidence which ultimately will comprise the record of these hearings. Neither should the testimony of anj' witness, standing alone and uncorroborated, be given undue weight, but, rather, the testimony of all witnesses should be weighed one against the other, after the record has been made, in an effort to sift the wheat from the chaff and arrive at the truth. Undoubtedly many good men will be
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 7
mentioned in the course of these hearings, and it is in the interest of such men so mentioned that I make this stateinent.
We begin these hearings making no charges. We propose to let the evidence precede our conchisions. We shall hear the witnesses and read letters and other documents. We shall strive to be fair. The first witnesses will be persons long associated with the institute and undeniably competent to testify from the stand- point of the institute itself. The first witness, Edward C. Carter, was secretary general of the IPR for some 16 years and is still a member of its executive board. He will tell us what the institute is. The next witness, Frederick V. Field, was national secretary for many years and is a former member of the executive com- mittee of the institute.
Before we proceed with the first witness I want to say a word or two about the future conduct of these hearings. * * *
The question has arisen, with regard to television, radio, and news pictures. The committee has specifically discussed these matters, and the ruling of^the com- mittee is that none of the proceedings of the committee will be televised and that no direct radio coverage of the proceedings of the committee will be permitted. News pictures may be permitted before and after the actual hearing sessions of the committee, but the taking of news pictures during the actual conduct of the hearings will not be allowed.
Neither will the committee permit the photographing of witnesses with members of the committee in the hearing room, nor the photographing of witnesses in the hearing room without the permission of the witnesses.
The committee has made these decisions because we are seeking facts, not publicity. We want to make a record, not to make headlines. Furthermore, we want to make it clear that no witness who is called here will be subjected to undue publicity against his will.
The committee has also discussed the matter of the submission of questions by Senators who are not members of the Internal Security Subcommittee. It is the order of the committee that any such questions should be submitted in writing to the chairman presiding at the hearing, to be asked by him at his direction.
Any witness called here may have the privilege of being accompanied and advised by counsel of his choice; but witnesses' counsel will not be permitted to testify nor to ask questions. This is not a trial, but an inquiry, and we intend to proceed in an orderly way. In the interests of expediting these hearings, members of the committee have agreed to refrain from filling the record with their own observations; and witnesses will be asked to limit their testimony to responsive answers to questions. However, after the conclusion of liis testimony, an3^ witness niay file, for the record, any such supplementary statement as he may desire to make; and a reasonable time limit will be allowed, in an}^ case, for the submission of such a statement (pp. 2-5).
Early in the investigation, there was discussion regarding the weight to be given to hearsay testimony. The discussion arose as a residt of Mr. Budenz' assertion that lie has been told by Alexander Trachtenberg, "cultiu'al commissar of the Communists in this country," that the Institute of Pacific Relations was "the little red schoolliouse for teaching certain people in Washington how to think with the Soviet Union in the Far East" (p. 517).
Senator Ferguson. You see, we hear a lot said about so much evidence in this conspiracy being hearsay. And I am trying to get at the point as to what weight this committee can give to hearsay of this nature. Are you able to tell the committee now that in your opinion this is, let us say, a hearsay that deserves consideration by a committee?
Mr. Budenz. This is an official communication between leaders of the con- spiracy.
Senator Ferguson. Among themselves?
]\'r. Budenz. That is right. An estimate of their work among themselves borne out, however, by other corroborating facts. The fact that Mr. Frederick Vanderbilt Field was secretary of the American Council, among other acts and other incidents of that sort which we cannot go into now in detail, support this judgment.
Senator Ferguson. In other words, there is so much supporting evidence around this hearsay that you feel absolutely certain this morning when you are giving this testimony that this was a fact?
8 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. BuDENz. Oh, I could not be more certain if I had heard this said within the Institute of Pacific Relations itself (pp. 517-518). * * *
The Chairman. Right at that point, Senator Ferguson's observation a few minutes ago dwelling on the subject of hearsay testimony brings my attention back to a remark that I heard over the radio the following morning from the date on which the chairman made reference to the fact that hearsay testimony may be received on certain conditions. The authorities are unanimous that hearsay testimony is not ordinarily to be received. One of the exceptions is in the establishment of a conspiracy. All of the authorities are unanimous that where a conspiracy is being established or has been established, then hearsay testimony under an exception to the rule may be received.
The remark made over the radio was to the effect that this was testimony of a nature which would never be received in any court of justice. The gentleman who made the remark might stand corrected by reading Wigmore on Evidence or any one of the other standard works on evidence.
Senator Ferguson. Yes. I think I ought to put in the record the same idea that I have. And I do not wish to accuse any newspaper of misquoting what we said here, because I know the difficulty of giving accuracy on legal matters. As to those of us who are trained in the law, it is an easy matter for us, but some- times we feel that there are misquotations. I felt there was a misquotation on the radio and in the press on this question of hearsay. I want it understood that I have said as a lawyer, and I say it now, that after a conspiracy has been estab- lished statements between co-conspirators are always admissible in evidence.
The Chairman. As an exception to the rule.
Senator Ferguson. As an exception to the hearsay rule. And that applies in criminal cases. As a former member of the bench, I applied the rule. It has been affirmed in Michigan decisions in conspiracy cases and in cases that I tried on the bench. So I feel that I have made a study of it and there is no question about it. But it has to be applied, that when the conspiracy has been established then the statements among the co-conspirators, as we find here in this case, are admissible in evidence even in courts of law. That is the reason I was asking my questions on what you felt about this hearsay, how it was, and what weight you were giving it. Because we, as members of this committee, must weigh all of the evidence. * * * * * * ' *
Senator Watkins. May I observe that this is not a court, and nobody is actually being tried here. It is an investigation, and it is not bound by the same rules that a court of law would be bound by.
The Chairman. No; you are entirely right, Senator. But it has been the desire of the chairman to follow what he deems to be orderly procedure under what he understands to be and knows to be court pro^^edure as nearly as we can, so as not to get off into a wild field where there is no limitation.
Senator Watkins.. I greatly appreciate the chairman's statement on that, and I have admired his conduct of this hearing and the adherence to these rules of evidence, even though we are not required in this type of an investigation to observe them. I think it is being conducted on a very high plane. I say that as a former judge who has tried conspiracy cases and is acquainted with the rule just referred to by the chairman and Senator Ferguson (pp. 519-520).
THE FILES
The farm (mentioned heretofore) on which IPR files were found, was the property of E. C. Carter, secretary general of the Institute from 1933 to 1946. On February 9, 1951, a few days after the files were taken into the custody of the committee, Mr. Holland issued a press statement, in which he denied that the files "had recently been transferred" from New York, and declared that they had been moved in 1949, simply for reasons of overcrowding in the New York office. He added that —
The contents of these files had been well known to the FBI since the summer of 1950, at which time he and Mr. Clayton Lane, then an executive of the i*. merican IPR, wrote Mr. J. Edgar Hoover inviting the FBI to make a thorough investiga- tion of all the IPR files and records, both in New York and in Lee. Holland said that he and Mr. Lane took this action because the IPR's work has always been
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATION'S 9
open in the matter of public record. During; subsequent weeks a group of FBI agents made a thorough search of all the IPR files * * * (p. 1173).
Mr. Holland took the witness stand on October 10. He was ques- tioned at considerable length about the statement, and also about the location of all IPR files, Thus:
Mr. SouRwiNE. * * * I -^vant to sum up and be sure T understand your testimony. These files were at either your own office, in the warehouse of which you speak, or at Lee, Mass., or enroute from one of those places to the other?
Mr. Holland. To the best of my knowledge, they were (p. 1175). * * *
Mr. SoxjRwiNE. You made available to the FBI at that time (the summer of 1950) all of your files; that is, the ones in your office, the ones in the warehouse and the ones at Lee, Mass.?
Mr. Holland. We did. The way it was done was this way: We notified the FBI of our wish to have them come and look. They learned from us some were in Lee. They asked if they might go there. Mr. Carter provided them with the key to the barn. They worked there for something like 3 weeks, a team of them. He provided them with a heater to keep warm, because it got cold up there. They took out several hundred documents which they thought were pertinent.
Mr. SouRWiNE. They had access not only to your files at Lee but to all your other files?
Mr. Holland. Of course. Another team worked for many weeks in our office in New York.
Mr. SouRw^NE. You made available to the FBI all the files you had? You did not hold out anything?
Mr. Holland. Not to my knowledge (p. 1176).
Later, this colloquy occurred:
Mr. Holland. There is one important point, Mr. Chairman. I am trying to give you a full picture. Mr. Sourwine has not asked me the question, but I think it is only fair to say that this is what I have told the FBI: A few days later — I think it was 3 days later (after his February press statement) — Mr. Field came to my office on a Saturday morning and said
Mr. Sourwine. You finally figured out what I was driving at.
Mr. Holland. I was not sure until you asked me about the date. I wish to tell you frankly that Mr. Field came to my office and said:
"I don't know whether you know it, but ever since 1941 or 1943 there have been some old files of the IPR sitting in my cellar. There were a number of old vouchers and accounts which were sent down there in 1941 or 1943 * * * j have abso- lutely forgotten all about these until I read the news about this seizure. Then I looked through my own files because I was naturally curious to know what in the files there might be that would affect me. I found, along with a number of my own personal files in the cellar, several cartons — I think 20 or 24 — of old Institute of Pacific Relations files."
I was considerably upset about this, and said, "Well, I hate to learn this now, but it seems to me the only thing to do is to bring them up to the IPR." This I did. They are still there in the I PR offices and I have asked the FBI to examine them, too * * *
Mr. Sourwine. Are they included in the files you have made available to representatives of this committee?
Mr. Holland. They are right there in the office. I am glad to make them available at any time.
Mr. Sourwine. Have they before now been pointed out?
Mr. Holland. No.
Mr. Sourwine. When did you tell the FBI about these files?
Mr. Holland. I should think about 2 weeks ago.
Mr. Sourwine. Does that square up with all the other answers you have been giving here today?
Mr. Holland. I think it does, Mr. Sourwine (pp. 1177-1178).
During the luncheon recess, Mr. Holland telephoned to his office, and that afternoon he offered further explanations.
Mr. Holland. * * * in 1943 the old American IPR files from about 1927, the beginning, right up to 1942 — in other words, all except the current files which they needed — were moved to Mr. Field's cellar.
10 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Morris. All of them were put there?
Mr. Holland. All the IPR stuff at that time was sent to Mr. Field's cellar.
Mr. SouRwiNE. That is somewhat different from what you told us this morning.
Mr. Holland. Yes. * * *
Mr. SouRwiNB. * * * You mean that from 1943 until 1947 all of the files of the American Council of IPR which you had felt you could get along without and which had, in 1943, been moved to Mr. Field's basement, remained there in his basement?
Mr. Holland. Yes * * *.
Mr. Morris. How many people in the institute knew these files were there?
Mr. Holland. I am afraid I can't say. Of my present staff I would say that probably — I think only two people.
Mr. Morris. How about the board of trustees? Did they know?
Mr. Holland. I really cannot say * * *_
Mr. Morris. But the fact here is that Mr. Field at that time was an open contributor to the Daily Worker and therefore an open Communist, and was it not of some concern to the institute that all their files were in his basement?
Mr. Holland. So far as I know, no such concern was expressed (p. 1184).
* * * Now in 1949 * * * yQj, j^^fj sent up to Lee the old International files from 1925 to 1945, and most of the old American IPR files from 1927 to 1943.
Now, the exception is that in going through these files in Mr. Field's cellar, the girls — I don't know who they were, junior typists, and so on — they went down and saw there were several cartons — I mean transfer cases — there of old vouchers and of stuff that looked like duplicates and which seemed to have no value whatever for historical purposes. .This was left behind in Mr. Field's cellar (p. 1185).
Further questions regarding the files were raised during the testi- mony of WilHam W. Lockwood, who was a member of the research staff of the American Council in 1935 to 1940 and executive secretary of the coimcil in 1941 to 1943 (p. 3863). J\'Ir. Lockwood identified the following memorandmn, dated Februar}^ 23, 1939, which he had written to Air. Field, who was at that time executive secretary of the council:
Perhaps I am a Casper Milquetoast, but with all the investigations which have been carried on or are likely to be undertaken in Washington, I am a little nervous about any documents coming to rest in our files which suggest any ciuestionable dealings between the American Council and private corporations, especially as regards the relations of those corporations with the Government. There are one or two passages in this file of correspondence which for a person who is out to get us might suggest something improper.
If you agree, I suggest destroying the compromising parts of Oakie's letters of Febriiary 14 (first paragraph) and January 23 (third paragraph, first sentence). In addition, Sherlock Holmes suggests that you throw this note in the wastebasket and direct Oakie to destroy the carbons of these two letters together with 3'our letter of instruction to him.
Field replied to this by advising Mr. Lockwood —
We have a lot worse alreadv filed — just remember where the bad stuff is for Der Tag (p. 3878).
Mr. Lockwood had no recollection of the episode referred to in this exchange of memoranda. He did oft'er a comment regarding it, however:
At this time [he explained] the American Council was engaged in a number of research studies relating to American trade and investment and other particularly economic subjects, that is, trade, investment, et cetera, in the Far East, and of course at the same time we were receiving contributions for the support of the council's general program from a number of prominent American corporations, including certain corporations on the Pacific Coast like the American President Lines, Crockett (Crocker) National Bank, and so on. For this reason we were always acutely conscious of the problem of preserving not only the substance of the integrity and independence in our research work with respect to the sources of financial donations, but also avoiding even the appearance of bias or control or influence of improper character. My inference, therefore, which I think is supported by the substance of this memorandum, is that certain passages in this
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 11
correspondence seemed to suggest or might be taken by some outsider to suggest an improper relationship with certain American lousiness concerns. This was evidently the reason why I was uneasy about its going in the files (p. 3879).
WHAT IS A COMMUNIST?
As already indicated, the subcommittee's investigation revolved around the basic question of whether or not there was concealed Com- munist control of IPR, which acted in turn upon American foreign pohcy and American public opinion to the detriment of American in- terests. During the course of the hearings, 54 persons connected in various ways with IPR were identified by witnesses as participants m the Communist world consphacy against democracy.^ There was the sharpest disagreement between these witnesses and IPR spokes- men, however, as to just what a Communist is.
Mrs. Hede Massing, herself a former participant in the conspiracy, was asked by the chairman whether she distinguished "between being an actual member (of the party) and a member in spirit." This was her reply:
Why, Senator McCarran, I would believe that even then (1938), and of course much more today, there are many more members in spirit than actually card- holding party menibers, because, as I have explained very often — and I hate to do this but I think it is rather necessary — for many party members it is an order not to take out party membership. For example, "my affiliation really lasted for many years and though I was a Soviet agent and was closely connected with the German party, only for 2 weeks by mere coincidence actually was I a partv mem- ber. Still my affiliation dates from 1918 or 1919 to 1938, which is quite a long time, and this goes for many people (p. 225).
Another former German party member, Dr. Karl Wittfogel, who is now professor of Chinese history at the University of Washington in Seattle, explained underground Communists this way:
If you lay all your cards on the table, how can you play the game? (p. 310).
Prof. George Edward Taylor, director of the University of Wash- ington's Far Eastern Institute, offered a method of identification for those who, like himself, were never party members.
You have to build up a frame of references as to what the Soviet Union is after in general, what its relationships are to parties in the rest of the world, how they operate in general and how they operate in particular. Then you have to study your own field. You have to find out — and there are ways' of doing this, of course — you have to find out what the general party line is on a given subject at a given time.
Then in the areas you know best you examine a man's writings and bv what he leaves out sometimes as well as by what he puts in you decide whether he is dealing with all the facts that he should know if he knows anything about it at all or whether he is angling them in any particular manner.
Obviously with that type of interpretation it is extremely difficult to say exactly where a man would be in the hierarchy, how far away from the sun he would be, but you can, I think, with reasonable assurance over a given length of time decide whether certain people are following a consistent line or whether they are not (pp. 343-344) .
Mr. Hohand and his IPR associates did not accept such definitions as those quoted above. Mr. Holland indicated his own views in a discussion with Senator Eastland:
Senator Eastland. You do not find evidence of a large swarm of Communists in your organization?
Mr. Holland. I find evidence of a small number of people who are alleged to have been Communists.
1 Cited as Communist Party members, 46. Cited as collaborating with agents of the Soviet intelligence apparatus, 11 of above plus 8, making a total of 54 (pp. 147-148 of this report).
12 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Senator Eastland. Who were they? How many Communists were in your organization there?
Mr. Holland. Sir, I can tell you the name of only one whom I feel positive was a Communist at the time that he either worked for IPR or is
Senator Eastland. That is Field, is it not?
Mr. Holland. No, sir; it is not.
Senator Eastland. You do not think Frederick V. Field is a Communist?
Mr. Holland. I indicated in my last testimony that I regard him as a 100 percent fellow traveler but at the time he worked for the institute I did not so feel and even now I am not convinced that he was a Communist at that time. In his recent activities as I indicated I regard him as a decided pro-Communist.
Senator Eastland. You think he is a pro-Communist but not a Communist?
Mr. Holland. I have no evidence, sir, that he was a party member, but his actions were such that I regard him as a 100 percent fellow traveler. * * *
I wish also to register this fact — and I do this again because I think I should be frank with the committee — that I personally very much regret and deplore the action of the persons here who have refused to answer the question of whether they were or were not Communists. I know that their refusal to do this creates a suspicion in the minds of some people that (they) really were at some time
Senator Eastland. That suspicion is reasonable, is it not?
Mr. Holland. I have indicated that I recognize it does create a suspicion in the minds of some people.
Senator Eastland. It is a reasonable suspicion, is it not?
Mr. Holland. I wish to state what I have
Senator Eastland. No; I want you to answer my question.
Mr. Holland. My answer, sir, is that in some of these cases it seems to be a reasonable suspicion and in some it does not. In particular I want to emphasize that suspicion is not proof of guilt, and at least in some cases I am myself certain that these people were T^ot Communists when they worked for the IPR.
Senator Eastland. Wouldn't you think that man who is accused of treason to his country — that is what a Communist is^ — who is accused of being the very vilest and lowest creature that there is, when he is asked the question whether he is guilty or not, would be most anxious if he wasn't guilty to say he was not guilty?
Mr. Holland. That is the way I myself would react, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Eastland. Why of course.
Mr. Holland. But I do know that there are circumstances in which a person to whom it has been indicated that there are three or four witnesses who are prepared to testify against him to this fact, would decline to answer even though he himself felt that the accusation was untrue, simply because he would feel that in the event of a perjury suit his word would not stand up against the words of four or five other witnesses (pp. 3898-3901).
Another IPR spokesman, Mr. Lattimore, indicated doubt as to whether the Soviet Government itself is a part of the Com.mimist conspiracy. When asked by Senator Ferguson as to whether he came to the conclusion "if you ever did, that it is a conspiracy and has in mind installing its form of government world-wide," Mr. Lattimore replied:
Senator, I believe that involves questions of relations between the Russian Government, the Comintern and the Communist Parties of various countries on which I am not versed (p. 3494).
Mr. Carter expressed the view that Earl Browder, former secretary of the American Communist Party, is "100 percent American" (p. 175).
EARLY YEARS
Looking backward over his 27 years with IPR, E. C. Carter told the subcommittee:
I have done my role. My role has been more to organize and secure experts than to pose as an expert myself. My position has been more managerial than highly trained research person (p. 52).
His function, he explained, was —
to distinguish scholars from nonscholars (p. 52).
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 13
Mr. Carter was secretary of the American Council, 1926-33.' He was its sole stafT member until 1928, when he employed as his assistant a recent Harvard graduate, Frederick Vanderbilt Field (p. 79). Three years later Mr. Field's Harvard classmate and friend, Joseph Barnes, joined the growing American secretariat (p. 4035). Barnes' wife, Mrs. Kathleen Barnes, became an IPR employee in 1934 (p. 2600). Harriet Moore went to work for the council shortly after her graduation from Bryn Mawr in 1932 (p. 2561).
In 1929, Mr. Holland came from Australia to take a post as junior research assistant in IPR's Pacific Council office, which was then in Honolulu (p. 1213). The same year Luc}^ Knox joined the Pacific Council staff (p. 3906). (The council's office was later moved to New York, though the date of the move does not appear in the record. Minutes of an IPR meeting held in Moscow on April 12, 1936, note that Mr. Carter "explained the controversy between himself and the Honolulu group" (p. 3174), but the explanation itself is not recorded.)
In 1933 Mr. Carter became secretary general, and hence chief executive officer, of the Pacific Council, which is IPR's over-all international body (p. 6). The same year he established Owen Latti- more as editor of the Pacific Council's new international quarterly, Pacific Affairs. "I recruited him," Mr. Carter recalls (p. 21).
I was in constant contact with Lattimore throughout the times he was on the staff * * * I aii^ quite frank to say that I regarded him as a good American, a great scholar, and one of the best authorities on Asia (p. 59).
Mr. Field stepped into Mr. Carter's former post as executive secretary of the American Council (p. 80). Miss Hilda Austern, Miss Elsie Fairfax-Chohneley, and Miss Kate Louise Mitchell were added to the list of IPR personnel (exhibit 801).
The practice of holding periodic international conferences, begun in 1925, had been regularly observed through the years. At the 1933 conference held in Banff, Canada, a Chinese delegate named Chen Han-seng had m.ade his bow to the IPR audience (p. 4590). In 1936 plans were being made for another international conference at Yosemite, which was to be attended by the members of the recently formed Soviet Council of IPR (p. 3139).
IPR AND U. S. S. R.
What was the relationship of the Soviet IPR to the American and Pacific Councils? ^ Secretary General Holland said this:
A Russian scientific society, the Pacific Institute, was admitted as a national council in 1934. * * * The Russians were never active, however, except on one occasion, in 1936. * * * After 1939 they took no part in the institute's activities, neglecting to answer even routine correspondence (p. 1225).
Ambassador Philip C. Jessup, who was chairman of IPR's American Council, chairman of its international institute, and chairman of its research committee in the late thirties and early forties, said this:
A national council was established in the U. S. S. R., the Soviet Union, in 1934, but did not participate at all in the activities of the Pacific council after 1939 (hearing before this committee on June 20, 1952).
1 Secretary American IPR, 1926-33; honorary secretary and treasurer, U. S. group, second conference, 1927; secretary general, 1933-46; secretary, American Corncil, fifth conference 1933; trustee, 1936-51; acting secretary, American IPR, 1941; executive committee, 1941-46; nominating committee, 1941; corporate mem- bership committee, 1941; executive vice chairman, 1944-47, Indian-American conference, 1949. (Source: Conference and annral re* orts for above years.)
2 Voluminous data regarding the Soviet story was found in the institute's files. All of this data will be considered hereafter. For the moment, we confine ourselves to those items which touch on the spirit of the Soviet-American Pacific relationships.
21705—52 2
14 INSTITUTE OF PAaFIC RELATIONS
Jerome D. Greene, a founder of IPR, who took the stand at the institute's own request, said this:
* * * It was hardly surprising that Russian participation in the institute amounted to httle, and was abandoned in 1939 * *, * (p 3857).
W. W. Lockwood, present IPR, trustee, and former executive secretary of the American council, another who appeared at the institute's request, also spoke of the Russians refusal to take any effective part in IPR work (p. 3867).
In December 1934 E. C. Carter, then secretary general, took his staff to Moscow for a series of conferences with the newly established Soviet council. On his return, he wrote a long letter to Frederick V. Field, then executive secretary of the American council, describing his impressions of the Soviet group. The letter contained hand- written instructions that it ''may be shown to all in the office who are interested * * * (p. 4569). It was not, however, "for general circulation" (p. 4569). These are some of Mr. Carter's obser- vations:
From copies of letters which I have already sent you, you must have realized by now that the U. S. S. R. group could not have begun to work under better auspices. A majority of the members of the committee are members of the party. All are influential, all are operating large organizations that have very substantial funds. * * * (p. 4567).
Their official hospitality was discriminating and yet overwhelming in its abundance. They realized that our main job was serious discussion, but their provision for entertainment was a striking demonstration of the fact that the who^e machinery of the State and of the scientific world was at the disposal of the secretary general (p. 4569).
Mr. Carter also reported officially to the IPR staff that —
The atmosphere of the entire visit was one of the most friendly hospitality and cordial cooperation. It seemed evident that the Soviet group has determined to cooperate fully with the IPR, both in principle and in fact (p. 4507).
In 1937 Mr. Carter made another trip to the U. S. S. R. This was described in a letter to Owen Lattimore, which said:
Motylev (chief of the Soviet council) arranged for me to go several places in the Soviet Far East to which no non-Soviet citizen has ever been invited. The people in the British and American Embassies in Moscow were most envious and w anted to use my visit as a precedent to get permission to go to places like Komsomolsk themselves * * =^
With reference to Pacific Affairs the atmosphere Avas totally different from that which characterized our discussions when you and I were in Moscow (in 1936). At that time, you will remember, Motylev was on the offensive, particularly because of the Isaacs article and relationshi]). This year Motylev and Bremman were not even on the defensive * * *. They wanted me to explain to you that they were thoroughly ashamed of their failure to send articles and they made the most solemn kind of resolves to themselves (to) write and send you some- thing * * *.
You will have gathered by now that the Soviet IPR extended to me every possible facility and courtesy throughout my stay in the Soviet Union. The members of no council have made more comprehensive plans for a \isit of^an officer of the international secretariat or incurred as great expense (pp. 4570- 4571).
In 1939 Mr. Carter again reported on a visit to the Soviet Union. The report this time was sent to Dr. Jessup, who was at that time chairman of both the American and Pacific cotnicils. It referred to Motylev's—
* * * deepening confidence in the value of the institute and a desire deeper than ever before to find ways and means of strengthening the work of the institute throughout the world * > * (p. 2728).
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 15
* * * Motylev and Voitinsky asked whether I thought we ccnild get through our joint program of I PR and general discussion if 2 hours each day for 5 days were assigned for the purpose. I replied in the affirmative but the discussions became of such mutual advantage that we averaged 5 or 6 hours together each day during my visit (p. 2729).
Mr. Carter's final trip, as far as the record shows, took place in August 1945. Here is part of what he wrote about that trip to Mr. Lattiniore:
I found that some highly placed official in every Commissariat that I had to work with, was broadh* informed as to the work of the IPR, and fairly beamed that I had so timed mv visit as to arrive in Moscow on the very dav that the U. S. S. R. went to war" with Japan (pp. 2591-2592).
There were other documents in the files which threw more light on the IPR-U. S. S. R. relationship. A letter from Mr. Carter to A. J. Kantorovich, of the Soviet Council, dated November 23, 1934, states:
* * * there are always a considerable number of Soviet employees in the Soviet consulate and Amtorg, whom we have always found ready to assist the IPR whenever requested * * * (p. 3929).
The report of a round-table discussion during the institute's inter- national conference at Yosemite in 1936, records Mr. Lattimore as saying:
* * * The rise of the Soviet Union has vindicated the efficiency and prac- tice of an economic system quite different from that of the other powers * * *
(p. 578).
Several documents refer to the exchange of books and manuscripts between New York and Moscow. On April 18 Mr. Carter passed along a gift from Moscow to Chen Han-seng, a member of the IPR staff, with these words:
This is a big day in the life of the IPR for the first volume of Dr. Motylev's great Soviet World Atlas has today arrived. Two precious copies have come, one addressed to Holland and one addressed to me. Here, for your close perusal for a few hours is Holland's copv. Keep it safelv and see that it is locked up at night (p. 2705).
On August 29, 1939, E. V. Harondar of the Soviet Council sent a num.ber of volumes to Mrs. Kathleen Barnes of the Am_erical Coimcil. They included an English edition of the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Mr. Louis Budenz commented on the receipt of the latter volume as follows:
If I am correct, this is an advance copy before the .American Communists got it. We must understand the significance of this book, that it is the foundation stone today of Communist doctrine (p. 647).
Considerable data in reference to the Moscow purge trials was also found. An exchange of letters between Kate Mitchell of the IPR Secretariat and Mr. Holland, contained these references to the trial:
From AlissMitchell to Air. Holland:
Carter and I spent about 4 hours with Umansky at the Soviet Embassy on Saturday and got quite a lot of interesting side lights on the Moscow trials — particularly with regard to Romm (p. 4587).
From Mr. Holland to Miss Mitchell:
I'm intrigued bv your tantalizing brief remark about Umansky's comments on Romm. Do tell (p. 4588).
16 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Carter, wrote to Mr. Holland on March 5, 1937, as follows (p. 3932):
129 East Fifty-second Street,
New York City, March 5, 1937. Mr. William L. Holland,
Food Research Institute, Stanford University, Calif. Dear Bill: You will, I think, be able to help people who have been perplexed by the recent Moscow trials to realize that thev make sense bv loaning them a copy of the verbatim report of the Proceedings of the Mihtary" Collegium of the Supreme Court. January 23-30, 1937. I have just managed to secure a few copies and I am sending one to you under separate cover, as I know you will find it fascinating and will want to read it all the way through.
I think also that the very able law professor whom Alsberg so greatly admires will want to read it also.
The Trotskyists in this country are doing so much to play into the hands of Americans who are anti-Soviet tliat the appearance of this book is most timely. It looks to me as though those Americans who are delighting in the Trotskvists attack on the U. S. S. R. are ignorant of the fact that in supporting Trotskv they are supporting a war-maker, Trotsky's denials notwithstanding.
When the volume has been read by those whom you and Alsberg think would most appreciate it, it should be put in the Ubrary of the IPR in San Francisco. Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
On March 24, 1938, Mr. Carter addressed a meeting m Mecca Temple, New York City, at which Soviet Ambassador Troyanovsky and others discussed the trials. Mr. Carter said:
When they (the Russian people) think of the trials, they are thankful that their Government has at last been firm in dealing with what they regard as Fascist-supported intrigue to overthrow the Government of the Soviet Union (p. 296).
A few days later, Mr. Carter and Mr. Jessup exchanged these letters (pp. 889-890):
Prof. Philip C. Jessup,
Norfolk, Conn.
Dear Jessup: Would you be interested in dining with me and a few others at the" Century Club at 7:15 on the evening of Wednesday, April 20, to listen to a 100 percent Bolshevik view of the Moscow trials? I have iiivited Constantine Oumansky, the able, two-fisted counselor of the Soviet Embassy in Washington, to come to New York that evening to speak to a little dinner of a dozen of my friends and then submit himself to the frankest questions that any of my guests care to put?
If it is possible to accept, I can promise you a provocative and interesting evening.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
BiRCHFIELD,
Norfolk, Conn., April 2, 193S. Dear Mr. Carter: I accept eagerly and gratefully for Wednesday, the 20th Many thanks.
Sincerely yours,
Philip C. Jessup.
On pages 371-372, of the September 1938 issue of Pacific Affairs, Mr. Lattimore wrote:
The real point, of course, for those who live in democratic countries, is whether the discovery of the conspiracies was a triumph for democracy or not. I think that this can easily be determined. The accounts of the most widely read Moscow correspondents all emphasize that since the close scrutiny of every person in a responsible position, following the trials, a great many abuses have been dis- covered and rectified. A lot depends on whether you emphasize the discovery of the abuse or the rectification of it; but habitual rectification can hardly do
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 17
anything but give the ordinary citizen more courage to protest, loudly, whenever in the future he finds himself being victimized by "someone in the party" or "someone in the Government." That sounds to me like democracy.
Mr. Lattimore was in Europe at the time of the signing of the Hitler-Stahn pact, which precipitated World War II. The day after the signing of the pact, Air. Carter sent him a cable from the United States, asking him to proceed immediately to Moscow. Mr. Latti- more did not receive the cable until after he had boarded ship for the voyage home (p. 68).
A few daj's after the sending of this cable, Mr. Carter forwarded an article on Soviet-German relations ^vritten by IPR staff member Harriett Moore to Dr. Motylev in Moscow.
On the following January 15, he Avrote Dr. Motylev to inform him that —
* * * the pen name of Dr. Chen Han-seng and Miss Elsie Fairfax- Cholmeley are Raymond D. Brooke and Edith Cromwell (p. 50). (Dr. Chen Han-seng and Miss Elsie Fairfax-Cholmeley were IPR staff members.)
On February 16, 1940, Mr. Carter wrote this to Mr. Motylev
(p. 891):
Dear Motylev: You will, I think, be interested in the enclosed clipping from the New York Herald Tribune of February 15, 1940, giving the views of Dr. Philip C. Jessup with reference to the City of Flint at Murmansk. Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
The clipping referred to contained this paragraph:
Dr. Jessup paid tribute to naval officers, who were, he said, the firmest sup- porters of international law at present. He declared that the Soviet Union had committed no violation of international law in holding the freighter City of Flint at Murmansk. The action of the British naval patrol, however, in forcing the Mormacsun to enter a belligerent port he described as contrary to the neutrality laws of the United States and to accepted principles of international law (p. 891).
THE APPROACH TO THE COMINTERN
Mr. Carter's predecessor as secretary general of the Pacific Council was J. Merle Davis. In the 1929 edition of the IPR publication. Problems of the Pacific, Mr. Davis gave this account of trips he had taken during 'the two preceding years:
* * * In the autumn of 1927 and winter of 1927-28 the General Secretary visited Canada, the United States, England, and the Continent of Europe. He spent a month at Geneva studying the organization and program of the League of Nations and the International Labor Office and making contacts with their Secretariats. He then visited Moscow, met with Foreign Office officials and Third International * leaders to whom he explained the Institute of Pacific Relations. Through the Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, he was able to hold a conference with a group of specialists representing the principal Russian scientific societies interested in far eastern and Pacific questions. Tentative plans were made with this group and a committee was formed for the purpose of cooperation with the Institute of Pacific Relations and participation in the 1929 conference (exhibit 1368).
Mr. Davis' efforts to arrange for Soviet participation in the 1929 conference did not bear fruit, but in 1931 the Soviet Union accepted membership in IPR. According to the institute's own account, how-
* The Third International to which Mr. Davis referred was, of course, the Communist International or Comintern, which was created and maintained by the Kremlin for the purpose of organizing the world revolution against democracy.
18 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATION'S
M
ever, "The cominittee which was formed existed oDly on paper (p. 4577).
In 1932 Miss Lucy Knox, who had been employed in the institute's Honolulu office, went to the U. S. S. R. to join the staff of the Moscow Daily News. The editor of this paper was Alichael Borodin. Several witnesses were questioned regarding the Moscow Daily News and its editor. They were in agreement that the News was "a Soviet publication" written in English, and Borodin was "the chief engineer" of the first Chinese Communist revolution, which was planned in 1919 by Lenin himself (pp. 2451, 2719, 4583).
On December 11, 1933, Mr. Holland wrote Miss Knox a letter, a copy of which he sent to Mr. Lattimore. The letter follows, in part:
[Copy to OL]
129 East Fifty-second Street,
New York City, December 11, 1933. Miss Lucy Knox,
Moscow Daily News, Moscow, U. S. S. R.
My Dear Lucy: Doreen and I were greatly cheered to get your charming exposition of latter-day Marxism. I took the liberty of showing it to a number of people in the New York office, to their great enjoyment. I am awfully glad that you are learning, however late in life, a little something about the economic foundations of history. Unfortunately, of course, you are in the- wrong country for studying social revolutions, and I should advise you to hurry back to New York as soon as you can in order to witness the last vestiges of capitalism in this country before it is quietly buried under a i^ile of codes written at Washington by a bevy of young professors from Columl)ia. I say it in all seriousness because you simply have no realization of the way in which rugged individualism is being mal- treated over here. Liquidation of the Kullak was a mere trifle compared to the liquidation of Wall Street by the new boys at Washington.
We are immensely interested at the office in your pleasant remarks about Borodine, so much so that I am asked by Owen Lattimore, who, as you perhaps know, has been made editor of the new Pacific Afl'airs, on a quarterly basis, to inquire whether you could discuss with Borodine the possibility of his writing an article for us of five or six thousand words on some aspect of his work in the Chinese Revolution, or on present-day opinion in the Soviet Union on the develop- ment of communism in China. If Borodine himself does not wish to write, would it be possible for you to interview him and let us have the article in that form? I do not need to tell you that we really do not mind what the subject is about so long as it has to do with the Pacific in some way. We really are crazy to get something from Borodine * * *
Joe Barnes expects to leave for Moscow in January to spend 4 months or so over there. If you could arrange it, I know he would be more than deliglited to use you in some secretarial capacity. * * * Now that Barnes is going to Russia and Field to London early next year and Mr. Carter, as new general secretary, is setting off on the first of his world tours in February, I have been ordered to remain in New York during the winter, so that I shall probably go directly out to Japan in the spring. I want, if possible, to remain there for 12 months and produce a colossal book on Japan's tottering economic framework * * * (p. 2720).
Mr. Ijattimore does not recall that he was "crazy to get something from Borodin," as reported by Mr. Holland to Miss Knox. When he appeared before the subcommittee, Mr. Lattimore said:
I certainly never had any dealings with Mike Borodin (p. 3506).
Negotiations with Moscow were continued more actively after Mr. Carter became secretary- general. Here is how he himself described it:
Oumansky was a Russian Communist, a militant Communist. He had been, I think, press officer for the Russian Foreign Office in Moscow. Later he came as Ambassador to this country.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIOISTS 19
It so happened in one of mj' several visits to Moscow, trying to get the Soviet scholars interested in the Orient to form a Soviet chapter of the I PR, I was finally channeled to Oumansky's office. I had a long talk with him.
The Soviet officials had been negative before Oumansky listened, asked for IPR documents; said tliat he thought the IPR had proved itself as a scholarly and use- ful organization and that he had no power to say whether or not a decision would be made to form a Soviet IPR, but he would take it up with the highest quarters.
You can guess who that was.
That I might never hear from him again, or I might be called back, he said.
A few months later I was called back and the Soviet IPR was organized.
The Chairatan. Was it organized in the highest cjuarters at that time when you were called back?
Mr. Carter. Apparently high cjuarters approved the idea. The people I met were so-called researchers on Asia and the Pacific.
Mr. Morris. Did you realize at the same time that I\Ir. Oumansky was an important intelligence agent for the Soviet Union?
Mr. Carter. He was in the Foreign Office * * * (p. 152).
Mr. Bogolepov, former counselor of the Soviet Foreign Office, said that Oumansky "came to the Foreign Office directly from the in- telligence school, military intelligence" (p. 4584).
As noted in Mr. Holland's letter, Mr. Barnes was sent to Moscow in 1934. Mr. Carter joined him there in the spring. On May 26, they had an "informal conversation" at the Commimist Academy in Moscow with two Soviet officials, Voitinski and Abramson.^ During the conversation, according to the minutes thereof, "Both Mr. Voitin- ski and Mr. Abramson spoke with sincere appreciation of Mr. Barnes' helpfulness, his good command of Russian and his genuine accept- abihty" (p. 2702).
As a result of all this activity, the Soviet Coimcil of IPR came into existence in July 1934. Here is Moscow's own account of the event, as printed in the Soviet quarterly Tikhii Okean (The Pacific Ocean):
Institute op Pacific Relations in the U. S. S. R.
The International Institute of Pacific Relations, at present, consists of the na- tional Pacific institutes of the United States of America, Japan, China, Great Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines. At its regular conference, held at Shanghai in 1931, a unanimous decision was passed to invite the U. S. S. R. to join the institute. This invitation was repeatedly reiterated in the name of the institute by its secretary-general. The scientific research and economic organizations of the U. S. S. R., which are interested in the problems of the Soviet Far East and of the Pacific Ocean, decided to accept the invitation of the international institute.
To this end, the said organizations resolved to combine their efforts directed to the study of the above-mentioned problems and to establish a special Pacific Institute.
The founding meeting of the Pacific Institute of the U. S. S. R. took place on July 28, 1934, in Moscow. Present at the meeting were representatives of the Nil (Institute for Scientific Research) of the Great Soviet World Atlas, the All Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, the Institute of Oceanography, the Administration of the Great Northern Sea Route, the Chamber of Commerce, the Institute of World Economics and World Politics, the Kamchatka Joint Stock Co., and the East Fish Trust.
Thus, the above- listed institutions become the founding members of the Pacific Institute of the U. &. S. R.
The following board of the institute was elected at the founding meeting:
(1) President of the institute: Prof. V. E. Motylev (director of the Scientific
Research Institute of the Great Soviet World Atlas) .
(2) Vice president: G. N. Voitinski (chief of the Pacific "cabinet" of the Institute
of World Economics and World Politics).
5 These 2 individuals, as well as the meeting itself, will be further discussed at another point In this report.
20 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATION'S
(3) A. la. Arosev (Chairman of the All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with
Foreign Countries).
(4) K. A. Mekhonoshin (director of the Institute of Oceanography).
(5) S. S. loffe (deputy chief of the administration of the Great Northern Sea
Route) .
(6) A. S. Svandze (director of the Bank for Foreign Trade).
(7) I. A. Adamovich (chairman of the Kamchatka Joint-Stock Co.).
(8) la. D. lanson (president of the chamber of commerce).
(9) la. M. Berkovich (manager of the East Fish Trust).
Mr. A. Kantorovich was appointed secretary-general of the institute.
The chairman of the new institute, Comi-ade Motylev, addressed a letter to the secretary-general of the International Institute of Pacific Relations notifying him that the Pacific institute, which had been established in the U. S. S. R., was prepared to join the international institute as a member in response to the invita- tion extended by the conference of the international institute held in Shanghai in 1931.
At the beginning of September V. E. Motylev received a reply from Mr. Carter who welcomed the U. S. S. R. as a new member of the International Institute for Pacific Relations (pp. 189-190).
Some time after the founding meeting in Moscow, an unsigned, undated Report on Soviet Relations With the Institute of Pacific Relations was circulated among IPR's New York staff. The report was marked "Confidential — Not for Distribution Outside the Office.'' ft contained these paragraphs:
uA. Pacific Council. — The Soviet Union accepted membership in the IPR in 1931. The committee which was formed existed only on paper. More recently a new attempt has been made to organize a Soviet council, much more promising of success. The formulas of international cooperation are difficult for the Soviets to master, and our chances of getting the full substance of cooperation will de- crease in measure as we put emphasis on the constitutional and organizational problems involved. * * *
In the past, many of the institute's contacts in Moscow have been made with Narkomindel, the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. Several IPR official invita- tions have been extended to the Soviet Union through this department. In the future, it is recommended that the institute be punctilious in treating the Soviet Foreign Office as it would the Japanese or British. This means that it is legiti- mate to cultivate it, and to make every effort to secure its vmofficial support. At the same time, it would be well to recognize the same fiction of independence as in other countries.
The fiction is even more potent in the Soviet Union than, for example, in Japan, but it is quite apparent that the Soviet Union itself is going to maintain it. Several Soviet organizations, such as VOKS, the Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, and TASS, the Soviet news agency, have been established with very careful legal autonomy. Whether the Soviet council of the institute is established under VOKS, or as a'separate organization, the institute would do well to regard it in correspondence, etc., as an entirely independent and unofficial organization.
Such a policy would have advantages outside of the field of institute relations with the Soviet Union. It is fairly important to take safeguards against any cir- cumstances arising which might provide ammunition for these non-Soviet members of the institute who may suspect Bolshevik propaganda in the work of the Soviet council. If a clear distinction is established and maintained in institute circles between the Soviet council and Narkomindel, it will help in any such contin- gency. * * *
C. Program and conference. — It is difficult to predict whether the Soviet council will be very much or very little interested in this aspect of the institute, or to decide which v.ould be the more to be deplored. * * *
The two most important institutions in the Soviet Union for cultivation are the Institute of World Economics and Politics, which is a part of the Communist Academy and which is itself a sort of holding company for the Institute on China, and the "library of the Communist Academy. * * *
A. Exchange of publications. — The shortage of valuta in the Soviet Union and the high legal price of rubles to foreigners makes exchange almost the only prac- ticable way of building up resources in books and periodicals about the Soviet
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATION'S 21
Union. Arrangements for exchange of Pacific Affairs and the I PR memoranda are hsted in the attached folder. A special file in Miss Austern's charge contains full details of exchanee arrangements. * * *
B. Establishment of a research, library. — Except for the New York Public Library, there is no effective Russian library in New York. Especially on ques- tions of current interest and involving the Pacific, there is really no good library at all. Such a library would not be hard to develop over a period of years and the demand for it would be very large. The present collection of the American Council constitutes an excellent nucleus. It has been built so far by exchange and gift, and very little support would be needed to catalog it and enlarge it.
The possibility of the Soviet authorities endowing or supporting a New York library to the extent of making it a depository for a very large number of Russian publications has been discussed frecjuently in recent months. If the American Council wished to pursue the idea, and were in a position to provide the necessary staff, there is no reason why it should not be made such a depository for books on international economic and political relations, on Siberia, etc. Such a move would have to be made jointly by the American Council in New York and Wash- ington and by the Secretary General in Moscow (pp. 4577-4579).
Further Soviet-American meetings were scheduled for the end of the year. Miss Moore was sent ahead to prepare the ground work. Mr. Holland wrote her a letter, in which he said:
I quite envy you your job, and I look forward to seeing a swell report as a result of it. I hope, however, that you will not stay forever in Russia, but will at least find time to come and see Doreen and me in Japan or China. Perhaps this will easily be arranged when China and Japan have become dependent terri- tories of the Soviet Union so that you can come here and study the nationality problems of the natives. "Here's to the day" (p. 3909).
When asked why he had hailed "the day when China and Japan have become dependent territories of the Soviet Union," Mr. Holland replied:
I cannot honestly remember, Mr. Chairman (p. 3908). COVER-SHOP, DOUBLE-WAY TRACK OR ASSOCIATION OF SCHOLARS?
Meanwhile, what was actually going on inside the U. S. S. R.?
The answer to this question lies within a tangle of sworn testimony, letters, reports, memoranda, minutes of meetings, and selections from formal publications, which are scattered tlu-ough the entire record. The correct evaluation of this data was important to the subcommit- tee's investigation, since it revolved around the question of what IPR actually was.
Was'it a "cover-shop" (p. 202) and a "double-way track" (p. 4491), as Alessrs. Barmine and Bogolepov asserted? Or was it an interna- tional association of scholarly inquiry?
The evaluation referred to necessarily involved the closest scrutiny of the qualifications of Messrs. Barmine and Bogolepov, in order to determine the credibility of their statements. In the case of Mr. Barmine, the chairman found it necessary to assure him for reasons that will become apparent:
You need be in nowise fearful of any reprisal being made on you by any agency of the Government or outside the Government (p. Isi).
Alexander Gregor}'^ Barmine informed the subcommittee that he had told the story he was about to tell us, to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, several years ago, but had never before told it on any witness stand (p. 211).
At present he is chief of the Russian unit of the State Department's Voice of America. He is a naturalized American who received his
22 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
citizenship in New York City on July 15, 1943, after honorable dis- charge from the United States Army, where he served as a private. He had been a brigadier general in Russia's Red Army, and was serv- ing as Acting Ambassador of the Soviet Union to Greece in 1937, when he became a Russian refugee as a result of Stalin's great purge. Mr. Barmine asserted that most of his former classmates in general staff school had been "accused and shot" during the purge, although he "knew well that they were innocent" (p. 184). He said that the Soviet secret police followed him to France in an effort to kill him (p. 207). He told this story of his efforts to fight Communist infiltra- tion in the United States Government:
From the Army I was transferred to OSS and I remained in OSS, in the Office of Strategic Services, until the fall of 1944. At the s&me time I began to work as editorial adviser to Reader's Digest. In 1944 I wrote an article in the Reader's Digest about '.'ommunist infiltration in the Government apparatus in the United States.
When I was writing this article I had in mind the background of all the things I told you, but I was not considering it possible or proper to bring it out publicly. What I wanted, I wanted to warn the Government about infiltration, al^out the way, about the plans, and about the scope of the danger. I was discharged from the Office of Strategic Services after that (p. 212).
Mr. Barmine declared that following this incident, he remained with Reader's Digest in an editorial capacity and learned about a Chinese problem in relation with American foreign policy (p. 212). He said:
I was very much worried about the course that this development took, and about the propaganda that was spread at this time on China (p. 212).
He told of a book review he had written of Owen Lattimore's Solution in Asia in which he (Barmine) described Lattimore's advice as " camouflaged Communist propaganda" (p. 212). The review con- cluded thus:
This surrender of faith in democracy in favor of Soviet totalitarianism is per- meating American public opinion. Under its influence America is in danger of adopting in Asia this same so-called realistic policy of appeasement and self-abdi- cation which will not only abandon to totalitarianism se\eral small nations, as in Europe, but hundreds of millions of Asiatics. This folly may ultimately spell the doom of democrac.y throughout the world (p. 215).
This appeared in the New Leader for April 7, 1945 (p. 213).
Mr. Barmine's qualifications for discussing the IPR were based on his former connections with Soviet military intelligence. He said that he had first heard of the IPR as a cover shop when he wa,s en- gaged in an underground gun-running enterprise for the U. S. S. R., in the Chinese province of Sinkiang during the early 1930's (p. 195). His information about IPR came first from General Berzin, Chief of Military Intelligence (p. 202), and was supplemented by further discussions with otlier officers attached to Berzin's command (p. 203). Mr. Barmine also testified that he checked the IPR story during his flight to Paris in 1937 by several interviews with Gen. Walter Krivitsky (pp. 206-207). General Krivitsky was himself a high official of U. S. S. R. military intelligence who fled the purge (p. 207). Mr. Barmine's story regarding IPR will be detailed below.
Mr. Bogolepov also had a diplomatic and military intelligence career in the U. S. S. R. He testified that he was one of those who attempted to utiUze the German invasion of Russia as a means for overthrowing Stalin and l)ringing freedom to the Russian people (p. 4487). He broadcast propaganda against Stalin from ])ehind
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATION'S 2S
the German lines (p. 4487). But his efforts at rebelhon failed and he learned that the Germans, too, wanted "to enslave our people and to ruin our country" (p. 4581).
He stated that he had been "involved in some literary and scientific activities" in the Communist Academy, which brought him into direct personal contact with persons associated with the IPR (p. 4488). He said:
Actual!}' I was working under the same roof, and with the same people, who were connected with the American Institute of Pacific Relations. Here was the chief source of my information * * *_ -phe second part of my information I got directly from the secret files of the Soviet Foreign Office (p. 4488).
Mr. Bogolepov is presently employed by the United States Govern- ment on an assignment which the subcommittee is not at liberty to disclose.
barmine's story
Pertinent parts of Mr. Barmine's testimony follow (pp. 193-211):
Mr. Barmine. I remained lyesLV on this job. At this time for several years the Soviet Government was carrying the export of arms to the country of China. * * *
The Politburo decision was to consolidate all of it in one organization under cover of the Foreign Trade Department. So there was the decision of the Politburo at the end of 1933 to organize a special corporation. The name of the corporation was Auto-Motor Export Corp. This is one ot the corporations of the Foreign Trade Department. This corporation has an official charter approved by the Government for the export of automobiles and motors. * * *
* * * But there was a secret part of the charter which gave to this corpora- tion full and complete control in the execution of all of the export of arms from the Soviet Union * * *_
The War Department and Marshal Tukachevsky, who was Assistant Com- missar of Defense, offered my name as president of this corporation. * * *
I held this position until the end of 1935, when I asked to be relieved. * * *
I was president of the corporation and I was director of this motor department. I had to liandle tliese things directly. With this work you had to be in daily con- tact with the War Department and with military intelligence because of the things you had to do in a hurry. * * *
This job kept me not only in contact with the War Department but, besides that, that was the year of the most constant and close cooperation with General Berzin because he, from the War Department, was charged with handling this side of it. * * *
Mr. Morris. In this connection did j'ou ever hear of the organization Institute of Pacific Relations?
Mr. Barmine. Yes; I did. * * * jn order to come to it, I would like to mention the thing that brought the Institute of Pacific Relations in * * *_
At the end of 1933, when I was taking over the job of the ex]Jort of arms and delivery, one of the unfinished jobs we took was the export of arms in Sinkiang. That is a Province in western China. * * *
The Governor of the Province was friendly. At this time there was a Moslem revolt in Sinkiang. We were delivering artillery, planes, ammunition, shells, and rifles for this government. In fact, the situation deteriorated so rapidly that, once a lot of these things arrived at the Sinkiang border, Uramchi, the capital, was surrounded by rebels. So, I was ordered to put the bombs on the planes. These bombs were delivered right on the heads of the rebels around Uramchi. Then the Chinese Governor was billed later for this ammunition as deliv- ered * * *
We were dealing only with the Governor of West Sinkiang. At this time two brigades of the secret-police troops walked into Sinkiang. They participated and tried to liquidate the rebellion. This was never publislied in the press.
Mr. Sourwine. Are you speaking of Soviet troops?
Mr. Barmine. Yes; two brigades of NVD troops crossed the border.
Mr. Morris. Will you identify NVD?
Mr. Barmine. Ministry of Internal Affairs Security Police.
Mr. Morris. The Russian Security Police?
24 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Barmine. That is right. There were two full infantry brigades with artillery. When our artillery arrived to Sinkiang after this rebellion was dis- persed, the NVD troops took over the new artillery pieces which I was delivering there and left the Chinese the old ones, which they, used in suppressing the re- bellion * * *
After the rebellion was suppressed, the central committee and the Chinese commission of the Politburo decided to send a commission to Sinkiang which would work up a large plan of reconstruction, of financial help, of military help, of building the roads, airdromes, the delivery of the means of transportation, and so on.
The president of this commission was appointed, and he was a brother-in-law of Stalin who went to Sinkiang and remained there several months.
Mr. Morris. He is the man we had previously identified?
Mr. Barmine. That is right. I got in contact with Svanidze after they re- turned. They returned with the proposals which were discussed in the Sinkiang commission of the Politburo. They were approved by the Politburo. We had to equip completely 10,000 troops which would be independent under the orders of the governor of the Province. The son of the governor, the young colonel, came to Moscow and stayed and worked in contact with my office.
The plan included building of hangars, airdromes, roads, completing the aviation line established there, then completely equipping and organizing and training the 10,000 troops. Of course, it was not acknowledged, this question of dismember- ment or complete separation of Sinkiang. It was «till part of Nationalist China. So, among the equipment I had to deliver we even had to make Kuomintang stars, 10,000, which would be put on their hats. * * *
This affair took several months, and during this affair the problem came up about China proper, about the Pacific coast of China. General Berzin inquired of me if I am doing something in the line of the automobile department and the export of cars in eastern China. I said we were only starting. * * *
We had huge deliveries to Mongolia but nothing to China proper. * * *
He asked me if it would be possible that the W^ar Department and Military Intelligence would be interested in building on certain points along the China coast in eastern China the secret cache of arms and ammunition. * * *
This is a delicate situation. The corporation belongs to the Foreign Trade Department. The decision about any operation was to be approved by the Politburo. I couldn't deliver any arms without special decision by the Politburo, signed by Stalin himself. * * *
The first of my objections to General Berzin was that this is a very delicate affair. You have to have reliable people. Then you have to have competent people in charge of those branches.
Mr. Morris. When you use the term "reliable" you mean people loyal to your organization?
Mr. Barmine. No. I mean people who would be trained in carrying this kind of secret operation out, who would have military training to take care of arms and who would be responsible enough not to let these things all open.
Senator Ferguson. That was secret, the armed part of your corporation?
Mr. Barmine. Always top secret.
Senator Ferguson. Putting it in the warehouse, putting the motors and the automobiles in the warehouse, was secret because, after all, they were arms and ammunition?
Mr. Barmine. The Soviet Government didn't care about it being known we are exporting arms. * * *
General Berzin said, "We might give you our men."
Mr. Morris. They are members of the Soviet military intelligence organiza- tion?
Mr. Barmine. When General Berzin said, "I might give you our men," I assumed that is the only thing he could mean. I didn't question him more.
In this connection several names were mentioned. Now I have to state here most of the personnel, except the top supervising jobs * *4I;* were used in underground work by military intelligence which was completely separate of what we were doing in the Foreign Office, and that work was carried by the foreigners, people with foreign passports, born in foreign countries, because they would not be so obvious as Russians. All the top controlling positions would be Russians and even not always that. Most of the personnel would be all professional intelli- gence people, recruited from the different groups, people recruited among the sympathizers of Communist causes or even men specially assigned by the foreign Communist Party for military intelligence work.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIOlSrS 25
Of course, at the moment when they would be detached for the military intelli- gence work they would have to break any connection, formal connection, with the Communist Party. * * *
When the question of using military men of the intelligence apparatus came to discussion, several names were mentioned of foreign nationahties. * * *
Mr. Morris. Who were the Americans?
Mr. Barmine. Owen Lattimore and Joseph Barnes.
Mr. Morris. They were mentioned as "Our people" by Berzin who could be assigned to this project you were complaining about where you did not have the personnel to staff.
Mr. Barmine. We played with this idea. * * *
We spent hours in long conferences on these. This was 15 or 16 years ago.
Senator Fergxjson. Just give it to us the best you can.
Mr. Barmine. To tell you exactly what words, I would not like to say any- thing I don't remember very firmly.
Mr. Morris. Will you tell us your recollection of that conversation and subse- quent conversations?
Mr. Barmine. All I can recollect is subsequent conversations, the question of the personnel or reliable people who ought to organize it or put in charge or to start this business * * *
Senator Eastland. He spoke of Mr. Lattimore and Mr. Barnes as two agents of Soviet military intelligence.
Mr. Barmine. He spoke of them as "our men."
Senator Ferguson. Meaning Russian men?
Mr. Barmine. It was my understanding meaning military intelligence.
Senator O'Conor. Had you ever heard of Owen Lattimore and Joseph Barnes before that?
Mr. Barmine. No.
Senator O'Conor. Did you later hear of them?
Mr. Barmine. They were the first American names that ever came to me.
Mr. Morris. These names came up not only once but they came up more than once?
Mr. Barmine. Yes. * * *
The Chairman. During a subsequent conversation did they tell you what organization these men were working with?
Mr. Barmine. When it came to the second time, as I remember, that was the first time the Institute of Pacific Relations was mentioned. The question was that there were more important things and they would be more suitable with the plans in connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations, the building up of the branches of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and the military using it for a cover shop for military intelligence work in the Pacific area. * * *
I had not the faintest idea that the Institute of Pacific Relations had anything to do with this kind of aff'air. All I knew about it was what I read in the news- papers at this time in Moscow. My idea was that it was probably some kind of geographical, scientific organization, and I think that was probably correct at that time.
Senator Ferguson. What year was that?
Mr. Barmine. I think it was shortly before, probably in 1934 or 1935.^
Mr. Morris. How did General Berzin describe the Institute of Pacific Rela- tions to you from this point of view? * * *
Mr. Barmine. * * * j^g gai(j tJiat we had some important planning develop- ments in connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations and the men would be valuable more in connection with this, so let us forget about them.
Senator Ferguson. What men would be valuable in that institute? , Mr. Barmine. Lattimore and Barnes, Americans * * *
* * * The idea was, as I was explained, that the Institute of Pacific Rela- tions being an organization who can carry research work, who can open branches around the Pacific in the countries where we were not yet recognized — the Soviet Union at this time has no embassy all around the Pacific area — with this difficulty about contacts, the idea which I was given was that that is the idea, undercover work when you can have legal reasons and innocent reasons to travel to do specific- ally military research and reconnoitering work and gathering of information materials, because military intelligence is comprised of the gathering of printed material, classified and unclassified, of every kind. You have reason to keep the foreign members of the military network on the job, you can send them from
8 This fixes the date of the conversation as 1935 or later. In executive session Barmine said of his con- versation with General Berzin about Lattimore and Barnes, "Kow I want to make the statement that that conversation was in 1935, 16 years ago * * *" (e.xhibit 1331).
26 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATION'S
one area to another, you can have for them a legitimate reason to have their offices to gather information, to get in contact with people who know something about geography, topography, and many other things.
So the explanation I was given was that the Intelligence Division considered this a very valuable outlet, a very valuable cover organization, they have an important plan for it, because it would be extremely convenient. * * *
* * * at this time this was considered important for Russia, which was developing to use this and to build within this organization the convenient appara- tus which could have this very innocent and lespectabie cover.
Senator Eastland. But to make it an agent of Soviet military intelligence was the plan, was it not?
Mr. Barmine. You see, how you come to make an agent, it is not just that you hire somebody for a job the way you hire for any organization. Some of the people who would work in the institute would not know that they were working for mili- tary intelligence. Some of them will be drafted into it gradually, first given an assignment to make an expedition for research to go to China, Manchuria, Korea, and then there would be military topography, and finally the men would be drafted in and one moment the point will come when maybe there will be dis- closed whom they are working for and they consider to be reliable and willing to do this job. That is a gradual process and diff'erent with every person.
Senator Eastland. Whether all the people knew it or not, the Soviet military intelligence planned that this organization would be its agent?
Mr. Barmine. I would term it not as an organization as such but the organiza- tion woidd be infiltrated, then the organization would be used for recruiting, for bringing people into this organization, and gradually take some of them who came to this organization with an innocent purpose or scientific purpose.
Senator Eastland. Did you know at that time that Mr. Lattimore was in the Institute of Pacific Relations?
Mr. Barmine. No, I didn't.
Mr. Morris. You learned it in the conversations?
Mr. BaRiMine. We had plans for them in the Institute of Pacific Relations. I couldn't ask who ]\Ir. Lattimore was, what he was doing, was he on the job there or not.
I explained to you all this procedure. For me, I had by this time intelli- gence training. I went through special courses. It was not necessary to explain to me all this in detail, just mentioning the question we are going and we are plan- ning to use this for our purpose; it would be not for me — all the rest I told you, the matter of operation would be something part of my training, I would know how it was done. It was not necessary to be explained to me in connection with the institute.
Senator Eastland. Later General Berzin told you to forget the plans for Lattiniore and Barnes, that they had more important assignments for them?
Mr. Barmine. In connection with the institute. Then I asked questions about the institute * * *
Of course you have sometimes what we call a cover shop. It was specially organized for the narrow military purpose. It was phony, it was a fake. There would be some import-export business or some kind of shop or some tourist office which would be built as a place for a rendezvous or a gathering and for giving the reason for legal residence in the area.
Now this of course was a different project to the extent they had an organiza- tion that existed already that was found to be ideally suitable for not just one local place but there was a whole Pacihc area that they could give movement for people and open very large possibilities for intelligence work. So it was not especially built up from an organization which should be infiltrated, taken over at the most decided jjlace. When the question of moving people, there would be enough people there who could report to the military network, work within the organization undisturbed for their operations for collection of material, for recruiting people and all.
Senator FERcursoN. So the Institute of Pacific Relations was the latter set-up that you were going to use and were using; is that right?
Mr. Barmine. That is right; that is my understanding of it * * *
At this time, as I understood it, it was already in process.
Senator Ferguson. It was your understanding that these Americans were already in this service or would be put in the Institute of Pacific Relations?
Mr. Barmine. In the service generally. Whether they were at this time actively connected with the IPR and there were plans for them to do it, I wouldn't know it.
* * * I was told we have plans for them in connection with the institute.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 27
Mr. Morris. Di ' you recall the two names so that when you had a discussion with General Krivit^ky some years later you asked him about those?
Mr. Barmine. That is right.
Senator Ferguson. What was the time of the conversation?
Mr. Barmine. It was in early 1938 when I was in Franco.
Mr. Morris. This is after 3'ou had separated yourself from the Soviet organi- zation?
Mr. Barmine. That is right.
* * * after several Soviet attempts on me the French Government gave me special protection. I had two detectives day and night with me who were ac- companying me wherever I would go in Paris, and also police in the night near my house. Once one of the detectives told me that the other two were guarding General Krivitsky in Paris, they kept him in the hotel room under constant guard. He told me he was very jittery and nervous, very depressed, and they were just worrying about him very much. Then my French friends who were in contact with him said that he asked if possible that I should go and see him probably to cheer him up, because I was maybe in a better mood. So it was arranged that I would go and see him in his hotel and talk.
Well, I had a personal interest in this rendezvous for other reasons because in 1937 in Paris when there was a special group assigned, sent partly from Moscow and partly organized in France, which had an assignment to kill Ignatz Reiss and me
Mr. Morris. Krivitsky told you this?
Mr. Barmine. I knew this, because the French police blew it up and they arrested several * * *
* * * Krivitsky participated in this conference in which the decision to liquidate me and Reiss was discussed. I wanted to know about it, to ask Krivitsky what was talked and what was going on and his part in it.
The Chairman. You wanted to know how you were going to be liquidated?
Mr. Morris. He had broken with the Soviet organization also.
Mr. Barmine. * * * the people who came from Moscow, had an assign- ment to liquidate both of us. That is wliat Krivitsky told. So when I went to see him I was interested not only in cheering him up but finding what this was all about.
Now subsequently I saw Krivitsky two or three times more, always at his request. At one of these meetings there was talk of he was planning to go to the United States, he was trying to get a visa to the United States and so I was plan- ning to do the same thing * * *
So w^e were talking about the people who would come here, who we might see, and who we can approach or who we should be careful about, too * * *
* * * J -^Y-as checking him. In the first of my conferences with him and in the .second time when I saw him we talked for hours and I was putting the question to confirm to me what he told about himself. I would ask him about people in the military intelligence, does he know this one or that one and whom he would know.
Mr. Morris. You asked him if he knew Barnes and Lattimore?
Mr. Barmine. That is right.
Mr. Morris. You wanted to know whom to be careful of?
Mr. Barmine. Not necessarily. I didn't know anything about this man except what I told you. I didn't know about whom I should be careful about, but I asked him what he knows. As I say, this conversation went for hours. There were many things to talk and man,y questions to ask about people who disappear, about people who work, about people whom we might meet, and when the two names and several others came back again then I remember I asked him about the Institute of Pacific Relations.
Ihe thing I could only say was that he said this operation was very successful because he, who had contact with military intelligence people who worked in the United States, told me that. He was informed more than I was on what was going on in military intelligence work in the United States.
What he told me, I would be amazed how many very important contacts the people working in the institute got. * * * '
Mr. Morris. May I bring that out so it is clearly understood? In other words, when you discussed the Institute of Pacific Relations with General Krivit- sky he told you that that particular Soviet operation, the cover shop in the insti- tute, was doing very well and you would be amazed at what imi^ortant contacts they were making in connection with their work?
Mr. Barmine. Yes. * * *
Mr. Morris. Mr. Barmine, did he also confirm your impression of Barnes and Lattimore, your recollection of Barnes and Lattimore, that is?
28 INSTITUTE OF PAaFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Barmine. He knew about them.
Senator O' Conor. He has not told us specifically what General Krivitsky told him about Barnes and Lattimore.
Mr. Barmine. That they are working within the Institute of Pacific Relations and they are still, what he said, "They are still our men."
Senator Jenner. When the chief of the military intelligence says, "He is one of our men," would that leave the impression in your mind that he was a top Comniunist in America?
Mr. Barmine. Not necessarily. That assumes it; that doesn't preclude
^4- ^ ^ ^
Senator O'Conor. You have been very fair in not attempting to overstate a^y thing you do not know.
Mr. Barmine. It is difficult for me because so many years passed and so many things happened since, before, during, and after. This was very accidental and not a substantial part of whatever I went through. So I am rather under strain trying to remember exactly and answer questions that would be truthful. I am afraid to say something that wasn't correct.
Senator O'Conor. You did not anticipate at that time you would be in this position and it would have so much importance.
Mr. Barmine. I did not anticipate I would be in the United States and I did not anticipate I would ever have to talk about the Institute of Pacific Re- lations * * *_
* * * as I say, the process of becoming an active member is slow and gradual and different with every person, but as much as I can understand at this time, when I was told by General Berzin and repeated by Krivitsky my assump- tion was that they were in active and conscious participation.
Senator Eastland. Did you t«ll any agency of the United States Government what you knew about Lattimore and Barnes?
Mr. Barmine. When I was asked by the FBI agent who came to me I told him exactly the same thing as I told you. I was asked about it several times * * * and it was several years ago already and then they came repeatedly. So I couldn't tell you exactly the date.
Senator Ferguson. During this last hearing when they were having hearings before the Foreign Relations Committee last year were you approached by the FBI?
Mr. Barmine. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Did you tell them that at that time?
Mr. Barmine. That is right.
Senator Ferguson. Were you ever questioned by any of the committee mem- bers or the counsel about coming in as a witness?
Mr. Barmine. No.
Senator Ferguson. Or giving this evidence?
Mr. Barmine. No:
Senator Ferguson. But the FBI did have that evidence that you have told here this morning about Mr. Barnes and Mr. Lattimore; is that right?
Mr. Barmine. Well, if you call it evidence
Senator Ferguson. Well, your statements that you gave here.
Mr. Barmine. Yes.
Senator Fergu.son. You mean to count that as evidence, do you not? It is what happened?
Mr. Barmine. I have to tell you that when I got this to the FBI, I just con- sidered in the sense that I learned to understand the evidence, I was very re- luctant that this thing should be used, because I think it is a very old story and since then many things could happen, and that was all that I kiiew, but it was after all not my direct knowledge from the workings.
Senator Eastland. You just told them what you have told us?
Senator Ferguson. You understand what you are saying here today is evi- dence? You have been sworn to tell the truth.
Mr. Barmine. I know that is the truth. I am not legally qualified to weigh how much evidence is this (pp. 193-211).
Mr. Lattimore commented as follows on the Barmine testimony:
Mr. Lattimore. Barmine was a conspicuously reluctant witness before you, and in spite of leading questions by Mr. Morris and members of this committee, and their repeated efforts to aid liim in remembering conversations and events between him and other Reds, supposed to have taken place 15 or 18 years ago, his answers remained vague, apologetic, and full of qualifications.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 29
Barmine said that the other'Red general, named Berzin,"in a discussion of the possibility of opening Soviet intelligence branches along the China coast, men- tioned me and Joseph Barnes as "our men," whatever that means, in connection with the possible use of I. P. R. personnel in China.
Here Barmine made two slips. He referred to this discussion as taking place at the end of 1933
Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Chairman, if I might interrupt there, because of that date, would the witness indicate at what point in the transcript of the testimony Mr. Barmine said that this discussion took place at the end of 1933? It is the understanding of the committee staff that Mr. Barmine said it took place in 1935.
Senator Smith. Will you point that out?
Mr. Lattimore. That is taken up in the rest of the paragraph.
Senator Smith. Can you point that out?
Mr. Lattimore. Tnis is referring to the fact that a correction was made later and therefore doubtless it doesn't appear in the final transcript of the committee.
Mr. SouRwiNE. You mean a correction in the testimony of Mr. Barmine, sir?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't know.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Are you intending to state or imply that this committee has doctored the transcript of Mr. Barmine's testimony in publication?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't know whether the committee or its staff doctored the testimony, or whether Barmine made a request to alter his testimony, or what happened.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Are you making the charge that it was altered?
Mr. Lattimore. I am making the charge that, if I may go on with the rest of the paragraph — I think it explains it clearly.
Mr. SouRwiNE. I think you should answer that right now, sir. Are you making the charge that the testimony was altered after having been given, that the transcript was changed for whatever reason after the testimony had been taken down?
Mr. Lattimore. I'am''making"^the'"charge^that newspapermen who called me after the story — that newspapermen called me after the story appeared and Barmine's story was mysteriously updated! in later editions of the evening papers.
Senator Smith. What newspapermen called[you? Let us get that fact now.
Mr. Lattimore. The man who called me was,^as I remember, the United Press man. United Press desk man, in Baltimore.
Senator Smith. What was his name?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't remember his name.
Senator Smith. Who else called you, a newspaperman?
Mr. Lattimore. He was the only one — no, there may have been a Baltimore Sun man who called me too.
Senator Smith. You do not know who that was?
Mr. Lattimore. No; I don't.
Mr. Sourwine. Were you here when Mr. Barmine was testifying, sir?
Mr. Lattimore. No; I wasn't.
Mr. Sourwine. You make the definite statement here, and a statement you are offering this committee under oath, that he, meaning Barmine, referred to this discussion as taking place at the end of 1933. Do you know that to be so?
Mr. Lattimore. I am making reference to the fact that two different news- paper stories appeared.
Senator Smith. You do not know it of your own knowledge? Just answer my question, do you know it of your knowledge or not?
Mr. Lattimore. Senator, I don't know it of my own knowledge.
Mr. Sourwine. Have you read the record of Mr. Barmine's testimony at that point?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes, I have.
Air. Sourwine. Do you know what that record shows?
Mr. Lattimore. As the record now stands, it doesn't show 1933.
Mr. Sourwine. What does it show?
Mr. Lattimore. I am not — I would have to read it again to refresh my mem- ory, but my impression is that it doesn't show very clearly what year.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you mean, sir, that j'ou are stating here, on the basis of what one or two newspapermen, according to you, told you, that the testimony of this witness was different from what the record which you have read shows it to have been?
Mr. Lattimore. Not what newspapermen told me, I am basing it on news- paper clips.
21705—52 3
30 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. SouRwiNE. Are you testifying here on the basis of newspaper clips — if you please, Mr. Lattimore — are you testifying here on the basis of newspaper clips that the testimony of Mr. Barmine was actually different from what the record before this committee shows it to have been?
Mr. Lattimore. I am testifying that after the story appeared, I was called for comment because 1933 was mentioned and I said, "Why, my goodness, in 1933 I had nothing to do with the Institute of Pacific Relations." And the later stories carried the date 1935 or 1936.
Mr. SouRwiNE. And are you presuming to conclude from that that the record of this committee was changed, rather than accepting the possibility that a news- paperman might have been mistaken?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't say that, Mr. Sourwine.
Mr. Sourwine. What do you say, Mr. Lattimore?
Mr. Lattimore. I say that when I pointed out to newspapermen who called me after the story appeared
Mr. Sourwine. Pointed out what?
Mr. Lattimore. That in 1933 I had no connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations and that I was in the United States and not in China from 1933 to the autumn of 1934, after this, after I had been called on this point, Barmine's story was mysteriously up-dated in later editions.
Mr. SoxTRwiNE. Of the evening papers, is that not what you said?
Mr. Lattimore. Either the evening papers or the morningTpapers, I can't recollect now.
Senator Smith. How about the rest of the sentence, to refer to 1935 or 1936? You do not know how whether it was 1935 or 1936; do you?
Mr. Lattimore. The record reads, page 194 of the printed record, that Mr. Barmine said that he was appointed to the presidency of some trust that he was working for at the end of 1933.
Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, I do not believe that the witness' interpretation of what the record saj^s is of any particular value here.
If he has a portion of that record which he believes establishes his contention that Mr. Barmine said 1933, I think he should offer that portion of the record and let it go in now.
Mr. Fortas. Mr. Chairman, will you give a witness a minute to look at the record, since there is a question about the record?
Senator Smith. I thought we had it there.
Mr. Fortas. He hasn't had a chance to look at it since he has been asked the question.
Senator Smith. Mr. Lattimore, do you have in your possession, I mean for your own use, a copy of that transcript?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes; I do.
Senator Smith. Then I am going to suggest that if you can find any justification or statement about the 1933 and will send it out any time within the next 10 days, we will look it over and see it. That is to save time.
All right, Mr. Sourwine, have you some other questions?
Mr. Sourwine. Yes: I have one more question.
Mr. Lattimore, you stated and stressed the fact that you had no connection with the IPR until 1934. As a matter of fact, did you not attend the IPR con- ference in 1933?
Mr. Lattimore. I attended it as a delegate. I was not an employee; no.
Mr. Sourwine. You think the attendance at that conference was not a con- nection with IPR?
Mr. Lattimore. I will accept your amendment, sir (pp. 3099-3101).
Mr. Holland added this:
The statement of Gen. Alexander Barmine before the McCarran subcommittee to the effect that in 1933 Soviet military intelligence officers used the institute as "cover" for obtaining secret military intelligence, was the rankest hearsay. There is not a shred of evidence to support it, much less to justify the outrageous insinuation that institute staff members would have been willing to act as agents for Soviet military intelligence. General Barmine himself clearly showed while giving his testimony that he had serious doubts as to the validity of this so-called evidence. When asked by a Senator whether the FBI had the "evidence" that Barmine had just given to the subcommittee, he replied, "Well, if you call it evidence * * *" (p. 1225).
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELrATIONS 31
OPERATION INFILTRATION
"* * * if 3'ou learned the ^^Tong things about the Soviet Union," said Mr. Bogolepov, ''your thoughts are also wrong" (p. 4512).
The subcommittee has given the gravest consideration to the thought that with these words, Mr. Bogolepov may have put his finger on the spinal nerve of recent world history. If it is true that the western world learned the \vrong things about the Soviet Union, then is is certainly true that its thoughts were also wrong. If its thoughts were ^^Tong, the actions it took in dealing with the Soviet Union, the agreements it signed, the compromises it agreed to, the concessions it allowed, were wrong too.
For these reasons, we present here extensive excerpts from Mr. Bogolepov's testimony, together with surroundmg material that may help to evaluate its authenticity. The stor}- he put into the record did not simply involve the Soviet Council of IPR. It mvolved an agency deliberate!}^ set up by the Soviet Government to fill the whole of western thought with lies about the USSR, which non-Soviet writers and "scholars" served like lackeys.
The Bogolepov thesis was built on this foundation :
* * * you must understand that when I use the word "scholar," you can't compare it with your American or western notion of scholar, because in our Soviet country- a scholar is a politician who is working in the field of science. He is not a pure scientist. He does not know what objectivity is, and he doesn't care to be objective. He is carrying out the slogan of Lenin even before the revolution, saying that there is no impartial science, that there is only party science (p. 4490) .
Professor Poppe added this:
In the Soviet Union everything is political because the scientists and the students were always told that there is no science outside of policies. All science is political and so also they considered the culture as part of their policies (p. 2706).
Here is Mr. Bogolepov again :
Once I read a niemorandum written by ^lolotov in our secret files where the problem was discussed of our participation and utilization of the western press. I have to explain that before 1931 it was a general rule that the Communists should not write in the foreign press. It was a shame. It was a disgrace. But Trotsky was expelled from the Soviet Union and he had written articles against Stalin in the Daily Express, and these articles became very popular because they were written in the British newspaper. This gave the idea to the Soviet authori- ties that it was wrong to seek only the Comn^unist papers. In the memorandum of jNIolotov, which evidently laid down the foundation for the new trend of Soviet policy, written in 1931, it was stated [reading]:
"Who reads the Communist papers? Only a few people who are already Com- munists. We don't need to propagandize them. W'hat is our object? Who do we have to influence? We have to influence non-Communists if we want to make them Communists or if we want to fool them. So, we have to try to infil- trate in the big press, to influence millions of people, and not merely hundreds o f thousands."
Molotov made the report, and that completely turned over our policy. * * * (p. 4511).
In the Foreign Office we have had a special, I think you call it joint committee, where representatives of different branches of the administration were present. In this joint committee we present the members of the Foreign Office, then of military intelligence, executive committee of the Cominform, and a representa- tive from the central committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. This important body was responsible directly to the political commission of the Politburo for carrying out the infiltration of ideas and men through the iron curtain to the western countries. I have to make the point that the problem which we are discussing right now with you, the problem of the Institute of
32 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Pacific Relations, to me in Moscow was only a small and not a greatly significant part of the activities. It was a very big business of ours.
Senator Ferguson. What was? Propaganda?
Mr. BonoLEPOV. The infiltration.
Senator Ferouson. Infiltration in other countries.
Mr. BoGOLEPov. In other countries. Ideological infiltration, the creation of fellow travelers, inducing the western intelligentsia to write books and articles which were facorable to the Soviet Union.
Senator Ferguson. Was that one of the missions of the Foreign Office?
Mr. BoGOLEpov. That is right; yes.
Senator Ferguson. To get people in other nations to write articles and books in favor of Russia?
Mr. BoGOLEPOv. In favor of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party.
Senator Ferguson. Did they ever pay any money to get that done?
Mr. BoGOLEPov. The singular or the particular character of the situation is that the majority of the Soviet agents outside as well as inside are unpaid workers.
Senator Ferguson. State that again. I did not quite get you.
Mr. BoGOLEPov. I mean it is the general situation that we do not pay the agents. The agents work out of their sympathy toward the Soviet Union.
Senator Ferguson. How do you get people to write books without paying them subsidies, and so forth?
Mr. BoGOLEPov. Why do we have to pay for books? There are American pub- lishers to publish the books and pay for them. Why do we spend our own money? (pp. 4496-4497).
We have had, as in the case of Institute of Pacific Relations, many cover organi- zations. For these things, on which I talked to Senator Ferguson, we had a special organization which name is Litag. That is the abbreviation for the name literary agent. This was a nonparty organization, independent organization, as you in the west like to have them. Very solid people were in the head of this organiza- tion, a Russian professor, and the Foreign Office used this organization in order to contact the foreign scientists, scholars, to give them materials or even, as in the case of the Webb mentioned books, the full text was sent to them * * * (p. 4514).
Mr. Morris. Through the Foreign Office you had people in other countries write books favorable to the Soviet point of view.
Mr. BoGOLEPov. One British and one American. You certainly remember the British labor leaders, Sidney and Beatrice Webb, very reasonable people. They visited the Soviet Union in about 1935 or 1936, and the result of their visit was a two volume work, Soviet Communism and New Civilization.
Mr. Morris. That is, after the Webbs got back to England, having been in Soviet Russia
Mr. BoGOLEPov. Yes.
Mr. Morris. They wrote a two-volume work on Russia or the Soviet?
Mr. BoGOLEPOv. That is right. * * * The materials for this book actually were given by the Soviet Foreign Office.
Senator Ferguson. Given to the Webbs.
Mr. BoGOLEPov. Yes. They had only to remake a little bit for English text, a little bit criticizing, but in its general trend the bulk of the material was prepared for them in the Soviet Foreign Office * * * and I participated myself in part of this work. * * *
An American example: You know perhaps Professor Hazard of Columbia University. He is an expert on the Soviet legal system, as you know. Professor Hazard before leaving the Soviet Union, where he spent 2 or 3 years, was given by the Soviet Foreign Office a bunch of papers concerning the Soviet law system and courts, which were later translated by him into English and published here in the United States as his own research work. Actually a lot of that material was presented to him in Moscow and is either Soviet propaganda or nonsense having no relation to the Soviet at all.
Senator Ferguson. In other words, the Foreign Office was careful to see that the Soviet line, the Communist line, was followed, and they could do that by preparing the information, and the American or the British or the other country's subject would take that and merely translate it and put it into books that would look as if it was the Webbs or the Hazards own material collected as facts, is that correct?
Mr, BoGOLEPov. That is correct.
Senator Ferguson. How large a staff or how large an organization did you have in the Foreign Office to do that kind of work?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 33
V
Mr. BoGOLEPOV. It wasn't necessary to have all these people in the Foreign Office itself. It worked this way. For example, we had to write for Hazard concerning the legal system, so we passed the order through the central committee of the party to the Soviet legal experts and they wrote it.
Senator Ferguson. And they would prepare the material and pass it in to the Foreign Office and you would give it to Hazard?
Mr. BoGOLEPOV. That is right, yes.
Senator Ferguson. What did the Webbs, of Britain, write on? What subject did the Webbs write on?
Mr. BoGOLEPOV. They described the Soviet way of life, which they found better than the British way of life.
Senator Ferguson. Where would they find that material? Where would that come from the Foreign Office?
Mr. BoooLEPOv. For example, the chapter concerning the very humanitarian way of Soviet detention camps and jails was written by the Soviet secret police itself.
Mr. Morris. You know that?
Mr. Bogolepov. I received it from the chief of one of the divisions of the NKVD, the Soviet secret police.
Senator Ferguson. You personally received?
Mr. BoGOLEPov. Personally I received from him when he came to my office in the Foreign Office, and then I gave this material to the chief of the western division of the Soviet Foreign Office, the vice chief of the western division, Vein- berg, who was attached to the Webbs and who proceeded to translate that material.
Senator Watkins. Did you read the English books after they were published, and you have compared the information with what was given out?
Mr. BoGOLEPov. Yes; when I came here to the west, I found this book and I read it with much interest. I found that the material which I prepared was so well done that the Webbs didn't change it any.
Senator Ferguson. In other words, the English people or the American people would take a book like that written by the Webbs, who were at least Socialists at the time, Marxists, and it was in fact prepared by the secret police of Russia.
Mr. Bogolepov. In that particular part.
Senator Ferguson.'«Iu relation to the jails.
Mr. Bogolepov. That is right.
Senator Ferguson. So, the American people would get the idea that this was a British writing on a subject, and, therefore, at least it would be true facts.
Mr. Bogolepov. That was the idea. * * *
Senator Ferguson. Do you know of any other example of an American coming to Russia and getting material and coming back and its being published?
Mr. Bogolepov. \es; I do, but •
Senator Ferguson. You are not rich enough to defend yourself in a libel suit?
Mr. Bogolepov. I have named one American, and I am reluctant to call any more.
Senator Ferguson. Do you understand, if you are telling the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth — —
Mr. Bogolepov. Certainly, sir.
Senator Ferguson (continuing). Testifying before this committee on question, you cannot be sued for libel?
Mr. Bogolepov. No; I don't know that.
Senator Ferguson. That is the law. With that in mind, now can you honestly state any other authors?
Mr. Bogolepov. Yes; I can.
Senator Ferguson. Or any other books?
Mr. Bogolepov. Yes; I can.
Senator Ferguson. Will you do it now?
Mr. Bogolepov. Frederick Schuman, Soviet Politics Abroad and at Home.
Senator Ferguson. What did he write on?
Mr. Bogolepov. He wrote a book which, in my opinion, is full of nonsense.
Senator Ferguson. Outside of its being n-nsense, what was it on?
Mr. Bogolepov. It was very important nonsense. * * * That was the idea, to sell nonsense to the foreign newspapers. * * *
Senator Ferguson. Give us an example of what was in the book.
Mr. Bogolepov. All right. For example, the book by Frederick Schuman stated that the unfriendly attitude of the Soviet Uni-^n toward the western wcrld was not caused by Communist doctrine or any other consideration en the part of the Soviet leaders themselves, but it was caused by western intervention
34 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATION'S
during the civil war. Mr. Schuman lets the American readers of his book believe that it is only because the American, Japanese, French, and English peoples made their so-called intervention on the side of the Russian national against the Com- munist that the Communist Soviet Union is now reluctant to have good relations with the British. If you compare Schuman's book with the corresponding page of the official History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union you will very easily recognize that they say the same thing. Frederick Schuman got his ideas from the Soviet propaganda.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know of any others?
Mr. BoGOLEPov. I recall Mr. Joseph Davies, the former American Ambassador to Moscow.
* * * In the same book of Davies I found, for example, his considerations of the trials in Moscow in 1937 and 1938. Now I think about the book Mission in Moscow. There the point of view is represented that this big trial in Moscow should be considered by Americans in a favorable light, because Stalin got rid of the fifth column, and saw the forthcoming disposition against the forthcoming attack. It is not known to me whether Mr. Davies was instructed particularly on this.
Senator Ferguson. You said "it is not known" to you.
Mr. Bogolepov. Not known to me. But it is known to me. I read myself in the record that this explanation of the program should be implanted in western minds during the j'ear.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know of any actual instructions like you gave on the Schuman book, and the Webb books, and the Hazard book, whether the material was prepared by the Foreign Office, and given for writing?
Mr. Bogolepov. Yes.
Mr. Morris. In the case of the Davies book, Mr. Bogolepov, you only know that you have seen a directive on that idea, and the same idea showed up in Davies' book. You don't know, as a matter of fact, that it was the same.
Mr. Bogolepov. No; in this particular case, I don't know. Well, the first sample I can give you was a book of Kahn and Sayers, two American authors.
Senator Ferguson. Albert Kahn.
Mr. Morris. And is it Manual Sayers? Michael B. Sayers?
Mr. Bogolepov. That is right. I do not remember the title of this book. It was something about the spies or aggression against the East; something like that.
Senator Ferguson. What is that book?
Mr. Mandel. Conspirac}^ Against the Soviet Union, by Michael Sayers and Albert Kahn.
Senator Ferguson. All right; go ahead.
Mr. Bogolepov. The largest part of this book which is known to me was written by a certain Vein berg, who was a vice chief of the southwestern division of the Foreign Office in Moscow. * * * j g^-^^ myself the Russian manu- script before it was sent to New York to be there * -t *
Senator Ferguson. Have you read the book now?
Mr. Bogolepov. I looked through it.
Senator Ferguson. Was it the same as the manuscript?
Mr. Bogolepov. Yes; it was. They rearranged it, perhaps, but the facts and the ideas are the same. That is why I mentioned it (pp. 4509-4514).
IPR IN MOSCOW
The story now returns to IPR itself. It M-ill be recalled that the 6-year efforts of two secretaries-general, Messrs. Davis and Carter, finally bore fruit in 1934. That was the year the Soviet institute was set up under a board of directors "a majority" of whom were party members (p. 4567). It was also the year in which Messrs. Carter and Barnes, and Misses Mitchell and Moore, made their missions to Moscow (pp. 2701, 4504).
Here is Mr. Bogolepov's recollection of that period:
Mr. Morris. Will you tell us what was the Institute of Pacific Relations as you saw it at that time?
Mr. Bogolepov. First, it was not an institute, but a desk or a group of research workers on China, Jai)an and other far-eastern countries. * * * At that time, I think it was the beginning of the thirties, the}' did literary research work. * * *
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 35
They worked as Marxist, and Communist scholars, but still as scholars. But in the course of time, toward the middle of the thirties, the situation became, in my opinion, changed. First, the people were changed who were working in our Institute of Pacific Relations. * * * From the old people who were working in the twenties and the beginning of the thirties in this body about which I am speaking now, only one person remained. The other sinologists •
Mr. Morris. Sinologists? Experts on China?
Mr. BoGOLEPov. On China and Japan — had disappeared and were out, then instead of them came in the true Communists who had not very much to do with science, but very much to do with some other matters.
Mr. MoRKis. What other matters do you refer to?
Mr. BoGOLEPov. I mean military intelligence and political intelligence.
Mr. Morris. Can you tell us who the one person who remained was?
Mr. BoooLEPOv. That was Anatole Kantorovich. He was a nonparty man. He was a real scholar. * * * (pp. 4488-4489).
As I told you before, with the change of personnel, the nature of the activities of our institute changed, too.
Senator Eastland. Military intelligence took it over, did it not? Soviet mili- tary intelligence?
Mr. BoGOLEPOv. Mostly Soviet military intelligence, also the Soviet Foreign Office.
Senator Eastland. It became an agency of the Soviet Government.
Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right (p. 4491)'. * * * the members of the Soviet Institute of Pacific Relations by way of their personal meetings, by way of sug- gestions to solve the problems, by way of sending their own writings and in other ways tried not onh- to influence the American colleagues of their own but to make of these people media for infiltration of ideas favorable for Soviet foreign policv in the Far East. * * * (p. 4496).
I got the impression from talks with mj- comrades working in the Soviet Institute of Pacific Relations, in the Foreign Office, that they considered this institute as a very valuable organization fiom two points of view. As one of my former com- rades expressed it, it is like a double-way track. On one line you get information from America through this institute. On the other hand, you send information which you would like to implant in American brains through the same channel of the institute. * * *
Mr. Morris. When you talk about two-waj' track, do you mean that military intelligence was extracted from outside the Soviet Union through the medium of the Institute of Pacific Relations?
Mr. BoGOLEPov. That is right.
Mr. Morris. And on the other hand, by the oat-way track you mean informa- tion that you wanted to impart to the outside world was transmitted through that medium?
Mr. BoGOLEPOv. Yes.
Senator Eastland. Propaganda, you mean. Soviet propaganda that the Foreign Office desired implanted in foreign minds A\ould be sent through the facilities of the Institute of Pacific Relations. That is what you mean?
Mr. BoGOLEPov. That is mostly propaganda, but I would say even a little more than propaganda, because not only organization propaganda, but even the organization of a network of fellow travelers in yours and other countries. * * * (pp. 4491-4492).
Mr. Morris. Did you know that the Soviet organization used the Institute of Pacific Relations to collect information not only in the United States but on other countries, such as .Japan and China?
Mr. BoGOLEPOv. It was my impression that, at that time — I mean before the war— when I was in the Soviet Union, the Soviet Intelligence was more interested not in the United States of America, but in Japan and other countries which were in direct conflict with the Soviet Union.
It was also my impression that the Institute of Pacific Relations was merely used by Soviet Intelligence in order to get, via America, the information on Japan and China and Great Britain (p. 4590).
Mr. Bogolepov was asked if he had any comment on the fact, previously reported, that in 1936 Mr. Carter and Miss Mitchell spent 4 hours at the Soviet Embassy, discussing the Moscow purge trials with Ambassador Oumansky. This was Mr. Bogolepov's reply:
It means that these people were considered by Ambassador Oumansky as important people. He had lost 4 hours to give them his instructions (p. 4586).
36 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
AGENCIES AND MEN
The Soviet quarterly, Tikhii Okean (p. 189), announced the formation of the U. S. S. R. Council of I PR in its issue of July- September, 1934 (p. 189). This announcement listed the constituent agencies that became members of the council. It also listed the council's directors.
Constituent agencies:
Nil (Institute for Scientific Research) of the Great Soviet World Atlas
All Union Society for Cultural Relations With Foreign Countries
Institute of Oceanography
Administration of the Great Northern Sea Route
Chamber of Commerce
Institute of World Economics and World Polities
Kamchatka Joint Stock Co.
East Fish Trust Directors:
1. President of the Institute: Prof. V. E. Motylev (director of the Scientific
Research Institute of the Great Soviet World Atlas)
2. Vice president: G. N. Voitinskii (chief of the Pacific "cabinet" of the
Institute of World Economics and World Politics)
3. A. la. Arosev (chairman of the All-Union Society for Cultural Relations
with foreign countries)
4. K. A. Mekhonoshin (director of the Institute of Oceanography)
5. S. S. loffe (deputy chief of the administration of the Great Northern
Sea Route)
6. A. S. Svandze (director of the Bank for Foreign Trade)
7. I. A. Adamovich (chairman of the Kamchatka Joint-Stock Co.)
8. la. D. lanson (president of the chamber of commerce)
9. la. M. Berkovich (manager of the East Fish Trust)
Mr. A. Kantorovich * * * secretary-general (pp. 189-190)
There is a mass of material scattered through the record, which describes both the agencies and men named above. It comes from three sources: (a) Official .Soviet documents; (b) reports, memoranda, and letters found in the IPR files; (c) sworn testimony of Messrs. Barmine, Bogolepov, and Poppe. All pertinent passages from this material are included here below.
The record indicates that some, if not all, of these agencies were subsidiaries of the Soviet "Communist Academy" (p. 4560), and that preliminary American-Russian discussions w^ere held there prior to the establishment of the Soviet Council (pp. 2701, 4492). The record con- tains the following testimony respecting the Communist Academy:
Mr. Morris. * * * Did you know what the Communist Academy was?
Mr. Bor-OLEPov. Yes.
Mr. Morris. What was it?
Mr. BocoLEpov. It was the highest scientific organization in the Soviet Union. If you speak of the science in the Soviet Union, you understand only the Marxist and Communist science. So it was the program where the Marxist theory was developed, where the Marxist scholars were prepared for difi'erent branches of Soviet administration, for Comintern, for difi'erent branches of Intelligence, for journalistic fields, and so on.
It was a very important organization, which has been preparing the people for work in Soviet administration (pp. 4586-4587).
*******
Mr. Morris. Is the Communist Academy an organization run by the Com- intern?
Mr. Poppe. No, by the central committee of the Russian Communist Party (p. 2723).
INSTITUTE OF PACTFIC RELATION'S 37
A document found in the IPR files contained this passage:
The Communist Academy is the citadel of the faith in Soviet Russia. It is charged with the task of training leaders for the next generation, and it is inevitable that these leaders should be trained essentially as political leaders. The the- oreticians and the dogmatists are both trained here. It has of course immense political power, can commandeer funds or people more easily than any other research or educational organization, has access to materials and documents elsewhere unavailable.
It has had almost since its inception a section which dealt with China. It has been variously named and organized, according to the political fortunes of its leaders. At present it retains its old name of the China Institute, but is also known as the National and Colonial Sector of the Institute of World Economics and Woild Politics, which is itself a part of the Communist Academy (p. 4588).
Testimony concerning the Soviet agency VOX included this:
Mr. PoppE. V-o-k-s, spelled in Russian. This w^as the old union organization for the cultural relations with other foreign countries. Its aim is the purchase of foreign literature and publication of that literature in the Soviet Union; second, exportation of Soviet literature; third, invitation of important scholars, artists, painters, musicians, dancers, and so on, from other countries; let them travel and make their performances, and so on; and the same also for the Soviet dancers and singers going abroad.
This agency would not invite the first, the best, person, no matter how impor- tant or artistic he was. Of course, they checked him thoroughly and only after they got an approval from the NKVD, they could invite him and send him tickets and so on * * *
Mr. Morris. You just know the general nature of Voks; is that right?
Mr. PopPE. I know the general nature, because I myself got my books from France and Germany through them.
Mr. Morris. Professor, was that operation supervised by the Communist Party?
Mr. PoppE. Yes; of course It was (pp. 2705-2706).
*******
Mr. BoGOLEPOV. The name of VOKS, the official translation of this abbrevia- tion is Society for Cultural Relations Between Soviet Union and Foreign Coun- tries. Actually it was one of the cover organizations for, again, these double tracks, getting information from abroad to the Soviet Intelligence, and sending infiltration of ideas and selling Communist ideas to the West.
Mr. Morris. He (Mr. Carter) talks here of distributing VOKS publications in the United States. Would that be Communist propaganda?
Mr. BoGOLEPOV. Certainly.
Mr. Morris. Would it necessarily be Communist propaganda?
Mr. BoGOLEPOV. Certainly. W^e have no other propaganda (pp. 4497-4498).
The following is quoted from The Report of the Visit of the Secre- tary General to Moscow, December 20-31, 1934 (p.4498):
Mr. KuLiABKO (acting president) then described some of the work which VOKS is carrying on at the present time:
VOKS represents 218 institutions and societies in the Soviet Union, scientific, cultural, literary, musical and artistic. Its purpose is to establish relationships with similar organizations in foreign countries. It also maintains direct contacts with many universities and schools in other countries. It organizes exhibitions of the work being done in the Soviet Union and brings foreign exhibitions to the U. S. S. R, Its book exchange now amounts to many thousands of books each year. It furnishes facilities to foreign students. It publishes a journal and numerous special periodicals in English, French, and German. It arranged for the American Institute which was held in Moscow last summer and which is to be repeated in 1935 for all English speaking foreigners, etc. (p. 4505).
From the testimony of Mr. Poppe comes the following, concerning the Institute of Oceanography and one Mekhonoshin:
Mr. Morris. Did you know^ of the Institute of Oceanography? Mr. PoppE. Yes. I knew" that was a scientific organization whose head was first Chakalsky, a very famous scholar, who wrote a large book on the ice in the
38 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIOISTS
polar seas. And this was a scientific organization and did not have anything in common with communism.
Mr. Morris. It did not?
Mr. PoppB. They studied only ocean seas, water, the plants in the waters, and so on and so on (p. 2723). * * *
Mr. PopPE. It was in 1936 and 1937, in connection with Stalin's destruction of Zinoviev, Borodin, and all the other well-known Communists. A great purge was started in all the agencies * * * (p 2699).
A document found in IPR files supplies this information:
The Institute of Oceanography is similarly a very important body. It handles both the scientific and economic side of the entire U. S. S. R. fish industry. Its work is of immense scientific importance to the future food supply of the U. S. S. R. and has a direct political bearing on the situation in the Far East because of the constant friction between Japanese and Soviet fishermen and because of the scientific competition that exists between Japan and the U. S. S. R. in the development of the fish resources (Carter to Field, January 16, 1935) (p. 4567).
The testimony of Mr. Bogolepov supphes information about Mr. Mekhonoshin:
Mr. Morris. Mr. Bogolepov, do you know Mekhonoshin? Mr. Bogolepov. May I see the name, myself? Mr. Morris. Yes.
Mr. Bogolepov. Mekhonoshin is the right name. Yes; I know him. Mr. Morris. Who was he? Mr. Bogolepov. Wliich year is that? Mr. Morris. 1936.
Mr. Bogolepov. 1936? » If I make no mistake, at that time he was the vice chief of naval intelligence of the Soviet Union (p. 4553).
From a document found in IPR files comes the following excerpt:
Institutions connected with the IPR. * * *
Institute of Oceanography of the U. S. S. R. (K. A. Mekhanoshin) (p. 4508).
THE ATLAS
From the testimony of Mr. Poppe:
* * * in general, mapping and publication of maps is controlled by the NKVD. The only agency publishing maps and permitted to do so is the chief geographic and geodetic department of the NKVD. They check all the maps and publish them, even an archaeological map. For instance, I added an archae- ological map to one of my books, and that map had to get first an approval of the NKVD because the cities, the frontiers, and also some other points there were indicated there.
Mr. Morris. Well now. Professor, do you remember the rather large-scale project that was undertaken by the Soviet authorities, to produce a Soviet world atlas?
Mr. Poppe. Yes, I do remember.
Mr. Morris. Will you tell us about that, please?
Mr. Poppe. Well, the atlas is an enterprise on a very large scale, and a special publishing house was created to compile and publish that atlas. It was Professor Motylev who headed that atlas. * * * It is a big Soviet world atlas, tech- nically done very well, but, as anything in the Soviet Union, it had also to comply with the Marxist-Leninist line of thinking. * * *
Senator Watkins. Did you know about this work that he was doing through some personal contacts with it?
Mr. Poppe. Of course, I knew how they were doing this work because lots cf people were working there, and I know also the publication itself. I have seen it. I have used it, and so on. I know what that atlas is.
Senator Watkins. Do you have a copy with you?
Mr. Poppe. It is here. It is a wonderful piece of work, technically, very beau- tiful; and the work was started very early in the early 1920's, and at Lenin's request. Lenin ordered that a large atlas be published, which would go along the Marxist-Leninist line, which would show the world as divided by the imperialists and as exploited by the imperialists, and so on. * * *
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 39
Mr. Morris. Where did you get this particular copy?
Mr. PoppE. Mr. Mandel gave it to me.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you identify where this volume came from?
Mr. Mandel. This volume of the Soviet great atlas comes from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. * * * (pp. 2697-2698).
Mr. Morris. Professor, could you tell us whether or not any elements of propaganda crept into the preparation of the atlas?
Mr. PoppE. Yes, of course, much propaganda.
Mr. Morris. Would you tell us about that, please?
Mr. PoppE. Well, first of all the atlas gives not always a true picture of the world, and the maps themselves are propaganda. For instance, there is one which shows Outer Mongolia. It is my field. I know Outer Mongolia very w^ell, and, therefore, I am entitled to mention this country in the first place.
One of the maps shows the world as economically dominated by various imperialist countries.
Mr. Morris. When you say "dominated" exactly what do you mean by that?
Mr. PoppE. Just exactly what they mean; that a country is economically being exploited by imperialist countries. The imperialist countries get raw material fro'Ti their invested capital.
Mr. Morris. How does a chart or map show that?
Mr. PoppE. Various colors — red, green, blue, and so on.
Mr. Morris. Give us a concrete example.
Mr. PoppE. For instance, the United States is amber, and countries being exploited by the United States are also amber or they are striped with amber, aad so on.
Mr. Morris. Can vou indicate tbat on that^particrlar page there?
Mr. PoppE. On t^is particlar page, Outer Mongolia is a country completely absorbed and integrated in the Soviet economic and political system. It is a Soviet satellite, but instead of presenting it in tbe same color as the Soviet Union, thej' give it the yellow color, as China, with those amber stripes, which means that the United States import and export from Outer Mongolia.
T^is is not true. Outer Mongolia had a trade with the United States. By 1926 or very soon after — T even knew a man by the name of Carter. He was representative of one of the American firms there in Outer Mongolia. He was expelled by 1929 or 1930 from Outer Mongolia, just as all other foreigners were, and the atlas was publis^ied in 1937. after the last American had been expelled from O'lter Mongolia. And Mongolia is shown as a country trading with the United States, for instance.
Mr. Morris. What year was that published?
Mr. PoppE. 1937. So it was 10 years after the expulsion of the foreigners from Outer Mongolia.
Mr. Morris. Are there other instances such as that?
Mr. PoppE. There are other distortions, of course. For instance, let us take one of the railroads which existed in reality here in the Soviet Union by 1935_ or 1936, but which is not shown here, and that railroad was vital for the Soviets during the Hitler invasion. * * *
Mr. Morris. Your testimony is that this is not an accurate atlas in that certain important and strategic railroads are not listed therein?
Mr. PoppE. I would formulate it so that things which should not be known to everybody are not shown here in this atlas (pp. 2704—2705).
From documents found in IPR files:
The aim of the atlas is to give a Marxist-Leninist cartographical picture of the world, i. e., a comprehensive picture of the epoch of imperialism and particularly the period of the general crisis of capitalism. * * *
The general underlying aim of the atlas is to present as fully as possible the con- trasts between the two great systems of the world, capitalist and communist, in their social, economic, and political policies, objectives and achievements (report of the secretary-general's visit to Moscow, 1934) (p. 4507).
Mr. Mandel. This is a memorandum from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, headed "ECC" presumably E. C. Carter, to CH-s, presumably Chen Han-seng, dated April 18, 1938:
"This is a big day in the life of the I. P. R. for the first volume of Dr. Motylev's great Soviet World Atlas has today arrived. Two precious copies have come, one addressed to Holland and one addressed to me. Here, for your close perusal for a few hours is Holland's copy. Keep it safely and see that it is locked up at night * * *"
40 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Morris, to show the importance of this atlas in connection with the In- stitute of Pacific Relations, I have a review here of the atlas by Owen Lattimore and I would like to read a paragraph, if I may.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, do you think that appropriate at this time?
Senator W\tkins. You may do so.
Mr. Mandel. This is from the September 1938 issue of Pacific Affairs, review of the Great Soviet World Atlas.
Senator Watkins. Published by the Institute of Pacific Relations?
Mr. Mandel. Yes, sir; and this is a review signed by "O. L." and I read one paragraph:
"The historical message, in short, of which special mention is made in the introduction, is extended to demonstrate the superiority of socialism as practiced in the Soviet Union with the deliberate purpose of arrival at a future communism over the capitalism of the rest of the world. The method, it must be conceded, is formidable. It is not vulgar propaganda, but scientific argument on a plane that commands full intellectual respect" (p. 2703).
MEN
Motilev
From the testimony of Mr. Poppe :
Professor Motilev is a party member * * * a Communist Party member, and an economist, not a physical geographer, a scientist of very little significance, but an outstanding party organizer, and a man who knows how to run an organi- zation under Soviet conditions. He was trusted greatly. * * * j(^ -^as his general reputation. I did not know him personally. It was his general reputa- tion that he was an outstanding organizer (pp. 2697-2698).
From the testimony of Mr. Bogolepov:
Motilev, Professor Motilev, the Red Professor, a party member charged by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union for leading the project of Council for Pacific Relations (p. 4561).
From a document found in I PR files:
Dr. V. E. Motylev, the Chairman (of the Soviet Council of I. P. R.) as director of the Gre.at Soviet World Atlas, has a budget of 12 million rubles per year, a large staff and the cooperation of everv leading scientific institution and library in the U. S. S. R. (p. 4498). * * * Dr. Motylev is an economist by training, but has wide background of experience in other social and physical sciences. He was formerly head of the Soviet Encyclopedia. He speaks English and German well and has traveled widelv in both these countries (Report of the Secretarv-General's Visit, 1934) (p. 4507).'
Varga From the testimony of Mr. Poppe (p, 2723) :
He is a very well-known Soviet economist. He was the one who predicted- among other things, a collapse of the capitalist system after World War II. He wrote books and articles on the economic depression imminent in the United States after 1945, but then it did not come true, and he fell in disgrace.
But Stalin, nevertheless, did not let him perish, and he is still the head of the Institute of Economics in Moscow.
Mr. Morris. Was he the director of the Communist Academy?
Mr. Poppe. Yes, he was. And he is also the director of the Institute of Economics of the .Academy of Sciences, a very important person, a Communist, Hungarian by origin.
Mr. Morris. Was he connected with the Comintern?
Mr. Poppe. He was; yes.
From the testimony of Mr. Bogolepov:
Varga, one of the most important people on this list, was the member of the executive committee of the Communist International (p. 4561).
From a document found in IPR files:
Varga is and has been for many years one of the principal theoreticians on foreign affairs in the Soviet Union (report on the Communist Academy, April, 1934) (p. 4589).
INSTITUTE OF PAaFIC RELATION'S 41
Arosev
From the testimony of Mr. Barmine :
I met him because he was my colleague in the diplomatic service. He was once Ambassador in Czechoslovakia. I knew him personally in Moscow as a fiiend. Then I met him on his job * * * Arosev was an old Bolshevik. At this time he had the confidence of the central committee. He was one of the hierarchy of the party * * * He was appointed as the president of the Society of Cultural Relations by the central committee of the party and, of course, he acted as such in his duties (p. 188).
From a document found in the IPB, files :
Institutions Connected With the IPR * * *
Voks (AU-Union Societv for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries) (A. J. Arosev) (p. 4508).
Svanidze
From the testimony of Mr. Barmine:
Mr. Morris. Mr. Barmine, do you know anybody else on that list?
Mr. Barmine. Yes; I knew Svanidze.
Mr. Morris. W'hat do you know about him?
Mr. Barmine. He is a Georgian. He is a brother-in-law of Stalin.
Mr. Morris. What else do you know about him?
Mr. Barmine. Svanidze was also high up in the hierarchy of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government. At this time he was director of the foreign trade bank, which means the organization which was in control of all financial exchange abroad.
Mr. Morris. In that capacity or holding that position he took a political assignment?
Mr. Barmine. I knew about his other assignments, too, which he carried abroad besides being president of this bank (pp. 188-189).
(Note. — Svanidze's part in the Sinkiang episode has already been described.)
From the testimony of Mr. Bogolepov:
Svanidze, who is said to be a director of some kind of bank, in reality was one of the chiefs of the foreign administration of the Soviet secret police, NKVD (p. 4561).
From a document found in IPK, files:
A. N. Svanidze is director of the Bank of Foreign Commerce, which finances all of the foreign trade of the Soviet Union. He is a graduate of the London School of Economics, speaks English perfectly, and is naturally extremely well- informed on the international relations. of the U. S. S. R. (Report of the Visit of the Secretary-General to Moscow, December 20-31, 1934 (p. 4499).
Abramson
From the testimony of Mr, Bogolepov:
Mr. Abramson * * * -^^^as a scholar * * *_ When I say that Mr. Abramson was a scholar, he was a Marxist and Communist scholar * * *^ He was clad in the uniform of the fourth division of the general staff of the Red Army, the military intelligence * * *_ j ga-y^- him in military uniform in his bureau in the fourth division of the general staff.
From documents found in IPR files:
Abramson studied in the university at Vladivostok, has lived in China, and speaks and reads Chinese (Memorandum of Conversation at Communist Acad- emy May 26, 1934) (p. 2701).
Abramson has worked out an alphabet, together with a group of Chinese scholars * * * (Report on the Communist Academy, April 1934) (p. 4589).
Harondar and Janson
From the testimony of Mr. Bogelopov:
Eugene Harondar, who is assigned here as being a secretary of t^e Soviet Covncil for Foreign Relations, actually is a man of pohtical intelligence — I mean of the
42 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATION'S
secret police. Janson was also a member of the foreign administration of NKVD (pp. 4561-4562).
From documents found in IPR files:
Kantorovitch has as his assistant Eugene Harundar, who speaks English , French, and German fluently and can take dictation and type rapidly in all. Harundar was recently political, or foreign affairs secretary to the Commissar of Heavy Industries.
Janson, as head of the chamber of commerce, has a large organization at his command, which not only issues information on economic questions, but carries on extensive research work for the improvement of Soviet products (Report of the Secretary-General's Visit, 1934) (p. 4499).
Kantorovich
From the testimony of Mr. Bogolepov:
Kantorovich, as I told you yesterday, was a nonparty man and a real scholar. They introduced him in order to have somebody who could speak about some research work (p. 4562). Kantorovich was arrested and executed (p. 4490).
From the testimony of Mr. Poppe:
Mr. Morris. Did you know Mr. Kantorovich?
Mr. Poppe. I never met him, but I read many papers written by him, and articles. Later on he fell into disgrace and disappeared, was eliminated.
Mr. Morris. Do you know whether he was an official of the Institute of Pacific Relations?
Mr. Poppe. Yes; he was (p. 2700).
Mr. Morris. Do you know whether or not Mr. Kantorovich, about whom you have given testimony today, was ever purged?
Mr. Poppe. He was purged and disappeared.
Mr. Morris. Will you tell us what you know about it?
Senator Watkins. Let me ask you this question: When you say "purged," for the purposes of the record, does that mean he was killed?
Mr. Poppe. "Purged" is so to say, he evaporated and disappeared.
Senator Watkins. In other words, he was just taken out and lost?
Mr. Poppe. He simply disappeared. Yesterday he was and today he is no longer. That is a purge (pp. 27 14-2715).
From documents found in IPR files:
Kantorovich, the secretary-general, is able, frank, well informed, and speaks English rapidly and vigorously. He was a member of the Soviet Embassy in Peiping. He is not a member of the party but would never have been made secre- tary-general if he was not trusted implicitly by party members. His special field of study is American policy in China. He has just finished a big book on this subject which will shortly go to the printers. He knew personally a great many of our mutual Chinese and foreign friends in China. He has got an excellent critical faculty and is a really first-class administrator. The speed and precision with which he made engagements for us while we were in Moscow was in striking and refreshing contrast to the delays of former visits.
Kantorovich's office is in the office of the World Atlas (p. 4568).
Mr. Mandel. I have here a carbon taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. It is undated, and it says, " Copies for W. L. H. for' IPR not"s' ":
"In case Kantorovich did not write you direct, this is sent for your information. I do not think it means any change in U. S. S. R.-IPR policy, as I gathered last December that Kantorovich's appointment was only temporary"^
Then follows a letter signed by A. Kantorovich, to E. C. Carter headed —
"Council of the U. S. S. R., "Institute of Pacific Relations.
"Dear Carter: This is to announce to you that both for personal reasons, and because of pressure of literary work which lately has been more and more insistent, I have decided to resign my position as secretary-general of the Soviet Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations * * * (p. 2715)."
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 43
Man With Two Names
From the testimony of Mr. Bogolepov:
Then I can mention a man who has two names, Abolin, and the second name, Avorin.
Mr. Morris. You say that is one person?
Mr. Bogolepov. One person; yes. In Moscow he was known as Aborin, in Manchuria when he was for a time consul general either in Munkiang or Kirin, I don't remember, he was Avorin. He has a surname which I do not remember. Under this surname he was known to me in the same fourth division of the Red Army. * * * This man succeeded Kantorovich. When Kantorovich was arrested and executed, then Avorin took up his functions of secretary general of the Soviet Council of Pacific Affairs (p. 4490).
There are no documents in the record from IPR files to indicate the identity of Kantorovich's successor as secretary of the Soviet Council.
Voitinski From the testimony of Mr. Barmine:
Mr. Barmine. When I returned from Bokhara in the fall of 1921 * * * I met executives and high officials of the Foreign Office in Moscow. Among them was Voitinski, who at this time was in charge of the far eastern section of the Foreign Office. * * * jje came to the Foreign Office from the Comintern and when he was also in charge of far eastern affairs. He returned back from the Foreign Office a couple of years later again to the same work. * * *
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you testify also, General, in the Comintern he was in charge of far eastern affairs?
Mr. Barmine. That is right (p. 188).
From the testimony of Mr. Bogolepov :
Mr. Morris. Who were the people who came in and took the place of the scholars that you just described? * * *
Mr. Bogolepov. First of all was a certain Mr. Voitinsky. Mr. Voitinsky was known to me in different conferences as a man who in the 1920's was a big wheel, big cog, big shot in Siberia when he liquidated a lot of former officers. * * * He was vice chief of the Siberian Cheka according to his own words. That is the first name of the secret police. * * * por this he had the Order of the Red Banner which he displayed often to us. I can't tell you all of this, but at the time when I met him he was already an old hand in the Comintern. * * * To me he was not a scholar and not a member of the institute with which I had been working, but first a man of the Comintern. He was carrying through the political line of the Comintern, and science was to him only a media to carry out his political Comintern line * * *_
Mr. SouRwiNE. Was Mr. Voitinsky a research man? Did he himself engage in research?
Mr. Bogolepov. Yes, with the help of other people. He didn't work himself. He had a lot of secretaries and assistants to whom he gave directives to get him the data, and he arranged all this or more often it was that he put only his sig- nature on articles which were written by other people (pp. 4489-4490).
From the testimony of Mr. Poppe :
Mr. PoppE. T know him very well. Voitinsky is an outstanding Communist, a member of the Comintern, a man who played a very important role in Chinese affairs. He in his youth was an organizer of parties of guerrillas against the White Russian armies in Siberia. Later on he became a member of the staff of the Soviet Foreign Office, and played a very important role in the far eastern devel- opment. Then he became one of the directors of the Communist Academy which later on was merged with the Russian Academy of Scientists, and became the nucleus of the future Academy of Scientists. He was also the director of vari- ous institutes in the Academy of Sciences, chief editor of the magazine World Policies and World Economics. He is the right hand of Stalin's No. 1 economist, Varga * * *.
He was a party man, a member of the Comintern, and in 1936 and 1937, he conducted a purge of the Academy of Sciences, and many people who worked together with me in my institute, my assistants, were purged, simply in conse- quence of his accusations.
44 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Senator Watkins. What do you mean by purged? What was the purge?
Mr. PoppE. It was in 1936 and 1937, in connection with Stalin's destruction of Zinoviev, Borodin, and all the other well-known Communists. A great purge was started in all the agencies, and all the universities, and' so on. I can only say, to give you an idea of what it was in my Institute of Oriental Study, that we had 94 scientists and 37 of them were arrested and disappeared forever; 37 out of g4_ * * *
Voitinsky delivered a speech in our institute where he severely criticized this man and that man, and so on, and a few days later there was. the elimination of all those people. So he was the one who gave the green light for those arrests.
Mr. Morris. Professor, do you know that this same Mr. Voitinsky was an official of the council of the Institute of Pacific Relations?
Mr. PoppE. He was; yes.
Mr. Morris. How did you know that. Professor?
Mr. PoppE. It was known because he was listed among the members in printed editions of that institute, and also in the magazine published by the Institute of Pacific Relations here in the United States, the Pacific Affairs. There, among the members of the foreign directors, the managers of the foreign branches Voitinsky was mentioned as a member of the Soviet Union, the representative of the Soviet Union in the Pacific Relations Institute (pp. 2699-2700).
From the Bolshevik Soviet Encyclopedia:
Voitinskii (Zarkhin), Grigorii Naumovich (born 1893), Communist, Comintern worker, writer. Son of a low-grade white-collar worker, Voitinskii completed only an elementarv school and supplemented his further education by reading and self-study. In 1913 he emigrated to America and hved in a number of places in the United States and Canada as a student and worker. In the spring of 1918 Voitinskii returned to Russia, joined the Communist Party and began to work in the Krasnoiarsk soviet of workers' delegates. After Kolchak had taken over the government Voitinskii took part in the underground work and in the uprising against Kolchak at Omsk. After the failure of the uprising he was detailed to underground work at Vladivostok. There he was arrested in May 1919 and sentenced to hard labor for life on the island of Sakhalin. In January 1920, still prior to the overthrow of the Kolchak government in the Far East, Voitinskii together with other political prisoners, and with the help of an organization of sympathizers who were free, took part in the seizure of power on the island. From 1920 on, he worked at the order of the Comintern in the Far East. He worked for a number of vears in the eastern secretariat of the Comintern. In the summer of 1920 he participated in the organization of the first Communist cells at Shanghai, Peiping, and Canton; he also took and intensive part in the further work of the Chinese Communist Party and, in particular, conducted the negoti- ation with Sun Yat-sen concerning the collaboration of the Kuomintang and of the Chinese Communist Party (p. 191).
From documents found in IPR files:
Voitinskv served for a time in the revolutionary movement in China (Memo- randum of "informal Conversation at the Communist Academy, Moscow, May 26, 1934 (p. 2701).
Voitinsky is a theoretician only by virtue of the refusal of the Chinese to make him an executive; he has a long and interesting career behind him in China. (Report on the Communist Academv, April, 1934 (p. 4589).
Not simplv because of the purge, but * * * because of a Nation-wide effort to increase efficiency in academic as well as in industrial and governmental work, a number of changes have been made in the personnel in the constituent scientific and other institutions that together make up the Soviet council. In view of these changes, it is necessary for Motylev and Voitinsky to reeducate some of the new officials. * * *
Voitinsky, as you know, has a long background in China. He first attended Sun Yat-sen's lectures in Canton in 1920. * * * in him we find a happy combination of the man of affairs and the very qualified scholar (from a letter written by Mr. Carter to Dr. Jessup, after the former's visit to Moscow in 1938) (p. 2729).
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 45
Scholarly Exchange, or I. P. R. "Litag"?
Exhibit No. 441
(Penciled notation:) Please return to RDC
Carlson Court, Pall Mall Place, London S. W. 1,
June 29, 1939. Dr. Philip C. Jessup,
Columbia University , New York City.
Dear Jessup: My report on Moscow will have to reach you piecemeal owing to pressure of engagements in Amsterdam, London, and Paris. This report will deal with Miss Moore's monograph on Soviet policy in the Far East. I must confess that I arrived in Moscow with a large measure of uncertainty as to what the attitude of the Soviet Council would be to a member of the secretariat writing on Soviet far-eastex-n policy. Without mentioning the author or the character of the contents I opened this section of our agenda by saying that we wished him "^ to criticize a manuscript which a member of the secretariat had written.
4: 4: 4: H: ^ 4< H:
Mr. Morris. Now I would like to refer to our exhibit No. 499, which was introduced at the open session of March 1, 1952. This is a letter from Mr. Carter to Mr. Motylev, and it is dated February 10, 1936 [reading) ; * * *
Does that suggest anything to you, Mr. Bogolepov? * * *
Mr. BoGOLEPov. The last paragraph, in my opinion, is very interesting.
Mr. Morris. What is the last paragraph?
Mr. Bogolepov (reading): "The American Council desires that I raise with you the question of arranging for the Soviet IPR representatives to meet in- fluential groups of American citizens in New York, Washington, Chicago, Denver, and San Francisco."
To me, it looks like this organization was used by the Soviet Government as a channel to bring people to the United States who otherwise, perhaps, might have some trouble in getting in, under the cover of research work and scholar- ship, and under the sponsorship of one of the American leading scholar organi- zations. It would be easier to get American visas. And I know, from my ex- perience, that it was the way on which we have been working, not only on this particular case. We were always trying to put our people not directly but through somebody else, through other channels as neutral as possible, and for this particular thing we plant agents in foreign organizations whose representation was particularly well fitted (p. 4571).
* 4: * 4! 4: * *
Exhibit No. 478
Meeting on Pacific Affairs: April 8; Motiliev, Voitinsky, ECC (E. C. Carter) OL (Owen Lattimore); Harondar; HM (Harriet Moore)
Voitinsky said that the magazine had been reviewed twice in Tikhii Okean and there the general opinion about it had been stated. Such a magazine which is important should have a definite aim (p. 3136). * * *
Motiliev said that even if the aim of PA was to characterize the general condi- tions, it was impossible to do this without a definite idea about them. When no definite idea is given for a magazine, the wrong idea is conveyed by it (p. 3137). * * *
E. C. C. said that PA will be without focus until the Soviet members contribute to it regularly. PA has never received the article from Voitinsky on agrarian problems in China. When Soviet articles appear regularly, they will make the issues clearer and will show up the negative quality of many of the other articles (p. 3138). * *. *
O. L. said that if the Soviet group would show in their articles a general line — a struggle for peace — -the other articles would naturally gravitate to that line. O. L. said that he had no organizational authority to tell the councils what kind of articles they should send in. * * *
Motiliev said that it was a dangerous editorial mistake to publish the Cham- berlin review. It is not because the review was about a book by Stalin, but because in the same review there was a review of a book by Chernavin. This is a very important political question for them here.
' Motiliev.
21705—52 4
46 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
They have no objoction to having Stalin's book r'^'>irwed and they are Millirp to answer a review, bi't ihi review mi st b' dine wi'ih d e respr ct, to a. person in Stalin's position. Motiliev ask( d \ hv ill book was given to Chamb'rlin v ho was known to be s^ ai ti-Sovict. * * *
O. L. said that hi' hid not r.-aliz' d Chambrlin's position, b't as soon as h ji^arned of the Soviet opinion abo't C'^amberlin, he cancekd an article on the Soviet press which he had asked from C amb< rlin. * * *
O. L. said that he was willing to have P. A. reflect such a line, but these positive ideas can only be started positively. He cannot dictate to the other coi ncils what thev m"st write. He mnst first have an original article taking a stand, and t^'is will make the others write to that point. * * *
E. C. C. said that the Isaacs and Chamborlin aitieles were great mistakes, and wo\ild not be repeated in the frtvre. H. M. said that O. L. had notling to do with t'^e Chamb'^TUn reviews. That was done on the responsibility of the New York Office (p. 3139).
« * * * • « t*
O. L. brought up the question of editing the vocabulary in left and Soviet articles. In regard to the Asiaticus article, he had to revise the vocabulary considerably or otherwise the article would have been discounted as propaganda. In the Kantorovich article, O. L. had edited out a number of thinrs but the New York office had put them back in. Voitinsky said that that would be impossible with their articles because they cannot give in on their point of view. No such editorial changes could be made without their approval. He said that he under- stood the prolilem of PA and knew what sort of thing they would have to write for it (p. 3173).
:(: H: * * * * *
Mr. Lattimore (reading) : "Motiliev sa'd that he would hke to wait to discuss this" — I don't know what "this" is — -"when Voitinsky was here. He said that he did not think there would be any critique of the general policy of the IPR. There would be definite ejuestions about Pacific Affairs, not as to its policy and contents but as to its juridical position as to the instrument of the IPR. He said there would be discussions and negotiations in connection with the question of preventing the publishing of articles which are in some way harmful to the U. S. S. R. IPR position."
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, did you know at that time Mr. Voitinsky's posi- tion with the Communist International?
Mr. Lattimore. No I dcn't believe I did.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Msndel, dees ycur research cf Pacific Aff'airs at this period of time indicate that anything appeared therein along the description I just gave?
Mr. Mandel. In the issue cf September 1936 cf Pacific Affairs
Mr. Morris. That is just shortly after the meeting you were discussing, Mr. Lattimore.
Mr. Mandel. Cited under the title "Literature on the Chinese Communist Movement" is the following notation of an article on British imperialism in China, from the Communist International, No. 6, November 1924, and another article by Mr. Voitinsky, entitled, "The Situation in China," from the Com- munist International, No. 21, April 1925.
This is taken from Pacific Aii'airs of September 1936, listing the writings of G. Voitinsky.
Mr. Morris. And you were editor at that time, were you not, Mr. Lattimore?
Mr. Lattimore. Of Pacific Affairs, yes (p. 3316).
Scholarly Exchange, or A/[ilitary Information?
Mr. Morris. * * * This is our exhibit No. 430 used in the open hearings of February 12, 1952:
"Memorandum op Informal Conversation at the Communist Academy,
Volkhonka 14, Moscow, May 26, 1934
"The following were present: Voitinsky, Abramson, Barnes, Carter. Voitinsky served for a time in revolutionary movement in China. Abramson studied in the university at Vladivostok, has lived in China, and speaks and reads Chinese.
"1. Carter and Barnes invited Abramson to write an article for the September Pacific Affairs on the romanization of Chinese. They invited Voitinsky to WTite
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONig 47
for the December issue on the land problems of Soviet China or the land problems of China generally."
I would like to skip down to paragraph 3, Mr. Chairman, and read this para- graph to the witness:
"3. Mr. Voitinsky said that he beheved the IPR could be of very great help to him in getting information and printed reports on the following subjects:
"(a) The inner situation in Netherlands India^ — the economic interdependence of the peasant and the city worker, and also the interdependence of these on capital and trade in Holland. The whole situation as portrayed in official documents in Netherlands India and in Holland would be of the greatest interest to the Com- munist Academy. The academy would also welcome information on the nation- alist movement in the Netherlands India. At the moment the academy has no Dutch-speaking member, but could easily get all Dutch documents translated.
"(b) He would appreciate" — This is Voitinskj' again —
"all the information the IPR can send him regarding the agrarian movement in Japan and the financial dependence of Japan on other countries. He would like to compare Lenin's theses on Japan, which he feels is stated in algebraic terms transformed into arithmetical terms, thiough a study of finance and trade. He would like very much more information than is at present available on the evolu- tion of the labor movement and the close relation between the village and the city."
Mr. Chairman, he goes on at length, and it all indicates that Voitinsky, about whom we have been taking testimony, was asking in this meeting for information through the Institute of Pacific Relations (pp. 4492-4493).
*******
Mr. BoGOLEPOv. * * * in the files of the Foreign Office T met more than once evidence that the people who were working in the Soviet Institute of Pacific Relations had been asked to ask their American counterparts to give some infor- mation concerning the fisheries in the Pacific area, and looking into the file I found always that as background for this- information was always the request of naval intelligence * * * (p. 4491).
Mr. Mandel. This is a photostat of a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated January 16, 1935, addressed to "Dear Fred," with the typed signature of Edward C. Carter. It is a photostat of a carbon copy of the letter.
Mr. Morris. And it has been acknowledged, Mr. Chairman, by Mr. Carter as a document — that is what it purports to be on its face — namely, a letter from Mr. Carter to Field. * * *
A later paragraph, Mr. Chairman, which I am now reading from, paragraph 8:
"I am sending you a list of all of the fisheries publications which the Institute of Oceanography is receiving from the United States. I would be grateful if you would have this checked through to see whether there are any important publica- tions not on this list which they should secure. Would you send this bibliographi- cal information to them through Kantorovich? They would also like to get from you reports from the private commercial firms engaged in every aspect of the fish business in the United States and Canada. I told them that you and Mrs. Barnes would do your best to get these, but that the scientific work of American business corporations are not always very extensive and that their financial statem.ents were sometimes intended to obscure rather than reveal the economic basis of commercial activity. It will, however, pay you to dragnet the two countries to get the reports of the various fish companies, for, about the time you get this letter, your library will receive about a cubic yard of the most important Soviet publications on -every aspect of the fish industry. You should immediately notify the principal fishing authorities in Washington and elsewhere of the existence of this priceless and unique collection on your shelves."
Mr. Bogolepov, judging by what 1 have just read to you, does that seem to be the same project that you have given testimony about before? Namely, that the Soviets were using the IPR to collect information of interest to the naval intelli- gence under the cover of this fishing study?
Mr. BoooLEPov. It looks like so.
Mr. Morris. I mean, can you develop that any further?
Mr. BoGOi.Erov. May I see the document, please?
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, both Mrs. Barnes and Mr. Field, who are being asked to collect this information, have been witnesses before this committee and have refused to say whether or not they were Communists on the grounds that their answers might tend to incriminate them.
48 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. BoGOLEPov. Well, sir, perhaps the best I can do is just to tell that from nine people mentioned here in this document, in this letter from Frederick Field to Mr. Carter
Mr. Morris. That is from Mr. Carter to Mr. Field.,
Mr. BoGOLEPOv. I am sorry; that is right. (Continuing:) There are only- three names which I can identify as having something to do with research work. All of the rest of them are members either of military intelligence or of Comintern (pp. 4560-4561).
Mr. Mandel. This is a photostat of a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, headed " Meeting, April 2, 1936, Moscow: Mr. Carter, Mr. and Mrs. Lattimore, H. M. Harondar. * * *"
Mr. Lattimore, will you read the sixth paragraph on the front page, which be- gins with " Motiliev." * * *
Mr. Lattimore (reading) : "Motiliev said that he was interested in receiving from the United States more material on the economic geography of the country; the official publications of Government departments, particularly the statistical reports."
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, did the IPR serve as a conduit for the Soviet officials to receive such information from the United States?
Mr. Lattimore. I have no idea.
Mr. Morris. I ask you to turn, Mr. Lattimore, to page 2 and take up the second item there on the top of the page. "II. In re: Pacific Affairs."
Mr. Lattimore ■ (reading) : "The discussion of this point was postponed until Voitinsky could be present."
Mr. Morris. Why should that discussion be postponed until Voitinsky was present, Mr. Lattimore? Did you know at that time Mr. Voitinsky was the head of the far eastern section of the Comintern?
Mr. Lattimore. No; I did not (p. 3315).
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, did you offer to supply military information to the Soviet officials of the Institute of Pacific Relations? Mr. Lattimore. No; I don't believe I did (p. 3319).
Exhibit No. 519
Meeting April 6: Motiliev; ECC (Carter); OL (Owen Lattimore); FD; Horandar; HM (Harriet Moore) * * *
OL asked if there was any special interest in the U. S. S. R. about the question of air bases in the Pacific.
LATTIMORE AND OUTER MONGOLIA
Two brief passages regarding Outer Mongolia, which were found in two documents, provoked more testimony revolving around the Bogolepov characterization of IPR.
(1) Voitinsky * * * suggested that there should be an article on aggression against Outer Mongolia, as this was so important now (p. 4574).
(2) Dear Owen: This is to report on my conversation with Motylev regarding your trip to Mongolia. Motylev is as eager as ever to have j'oli make the trip (p. 4562).
The first of these appeared in the minutes of a meeting held in Moscow April 12, 1936, which was attended by representatives of both the American and Soviet institutes. Mr. Lattimore himself was among those present, along with Miss Moore, and Messrs. Carter, Voitinsky, Motylev, and Harondar.
The second was in a letter from Mr. Carter to Mr. Lattunore, dated September 12, 1937.
Mr. Bogolepov gave this comment regarding (1):
Starting with 1932 and 1933, the Soviet Government was pretty well concerned with the defense of Mongolia as well as the Soviet Far East against possible
INSTITUTE OF PACTFIC RELATIONS 49
Japanese aggression. It was the time, I remember, when in the high Soviet organizations the mood was rather close to panic because all thoughts indicated that the Japanese might every day start the attack against the Soviet Far East and Mongolia. Whereas, the particular military measures were taken at that time by the defense commissariat, the NKVD was to mobilize the public opinion of the west, especially in England and the United States, in order to make pressure on the Japanese Government and to create an international atmosphere which would disturb the Japanese plan of attack on Outer Mongolia and the Soviet Far East.
So the passage you quoted here and which perhaps might look to you as a dis- cussion between two scholars actually was the carrying out by the Soviet of the political directive of the Soviet Government.
Mr. Morris. It says here that this was so important. Voitinsky said that was important — that was important to the Soviet Union.
Mr. BoGOLEPOv. Important to the Soviet Union (p. 4574).
Professor Poppe, who was once head of the Mongolian Department of the Soviet Academy of Science (p. 2692), added this:
Mongolia was completely wild, a nomadic country in 1919. The new revolu- tionary people's Government established by the Soviets and supported by the Soviets and getting orders from Moscow has achieved, of course, some positive achievement, such as they established schools, hospitals, and so on. And no matter who establishes schools or hospitals, in my opinion, does a good job, if there were no schools and hospitals before. But this is not the end of this story.
The deportation of the population of the Mongolian Buddhists, Lamaseries, the destruction and the annihilation of the Mongolian Government, the execu- tion of the Mongolian ministers, forced collectivization, the deportation of many people to the Soviet Union, and so on, are rather negative phenomena, I would say.
Therefore, I cannot call such a system a democratic one. * * *
In 1932 the entire population revolted against the Soviets. The Red Mongolian Army and many members of the Mongolian People's Army took the side of the revolters, and this rebellion was suppressed by the Russian Red Army, tanks and aircraft were rushed from Russia to Mongolia (p. 2724).
William C. Bullitt, first American Ambassador to the Soviet Union, also commented on the history of Outer Alongolia.
In 1921 the Communists bad set up a Communist republic there, as much Com- munist as anything can be in a country largely inhabitated by nomads. Then there had been a series of wars back and forth until 1924, when the Communists got pretty well on top. However, in 1924 the Soviet Government in a note which was signed T believe by Chicherin, recognized the Mongolian People's Republic as a part of the Republic of China, but stated in that note that it enjoyed autonomy.
If my memory is correct the Soviet Government got a bit disturbed, and I re- ceived information that Karakhan, one of the gentlemen referred to before, had been sent out to Outer Mongolia, the People's Republic, so-called, to finish off any signs of restiveness under Soviet control. When he returned from that trip he came to the Embassy
Mr. Morris. Did he return in 1934?
Mr. Bullitt. He returned toward the end, I believe.
He came to the Embassy one day, and I said to him — I don't mind testifying about Karakhan because he has since been shot and therefore no harm can come to him from the testimony that I am to give.
I said to him that I heard he had been out there to finish oflf the People's Re- public of Outer Mongolia or rather any signs of independence in it, and he said indeed he had, but it was a very small affair * * *
He said that he had indeed been sent out to finish it off, but he had only been sent out at the last minute, that the Soviet Government first completely infil- trated the Outer Mongolia Army and police force with GPU agents and that when everything was prepared to liquidate the Mongols that the Soviet Government did not like there, that he had been sent out simply to oversee the operation, that he had gone out, and then he explained, "After all, in a country of nomads there are only 300 or 400 people that count, and all I did on a given night was to have about 400 people seized by the GPU agents in the army and police force, and I had them shot before dawn and installed the people that the Soviet Government wished to
50 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
have installed and Outer Mongolia is vow completely ruled by the GPU"; that is to say, the Soviet secret police (pp. 4523-4524.) .
Mr. Bullitt then went on to describe a conversation he had with Owen Lattimore, in the American Embassy at Moscow.
In the end of Match 1936 I received a note from Mr. Carter, who was the secretary general, I believe, of the Institute of Pacific Relations. It was written from a Moscow hotel, and it said that Mr. Owen Lattimore was arriving * * *_
I told one of the secretaries in the Embassy that I would see Mr. Lattimore after he arrived in Moscow. I also told him to invite Mr. Carter and Mr. Latti- more and the other members of their delegation — I think it can be called a dele- gation— there were a number of women, if my memory is correct, as well as men — to an Embassy meal at some time, and they did so. In the early days of Ap-il, Mr. Lattimore asked for a definite appointment, and I received him. He toH me that he was there for this meeting of the Institute of Pacific Relations with, I believe, the Soviet section of the institute, and that he wanted to meet the men in charge of Far Eastern Affairs for the Soviet Foreign Office, especially StOTonyakov and Karakhan * * *_
Stomonyakov was assistant commissar in charge of far eastern afi"airs, and Karakhan had been for many, many years a=;sistant commissar. Indeed when I wa- sent in to negotiate with the Soviet Government, sent in by the American G'^vernment in 1919, he was already an assistant commissar. Whether at that p.'^rticular moment hi-; title was assistant commissar I cannot say actually, but he was a man that I knew very well.
I told Mr. Lattimore that I would ask one of the secretaries of the Embassy to attempt to arrange such an appointment or appointments for him.
Mr. Lattimoi-e then began to give me a long description of the situation in the Far East as he saw it. * * * ■
He finally said that he had one very important matter that he wanted to take up with me, that a most inspiring thing had happened, that the Mongols had at last achieved full independence and he hoped they were once more going to start on the road to being a great nation as they had been many years in the past. He said that in his opinion the so-called People's Republic of Outer Mongolia was fully independent. I asked him if there was no Soviet control of the People's Republic of Outer Mongolia or rather they call it the Mongolian People's Republic. It is in Outer Mongolia not Inner Mongolia. And he replied that there was no Soviet control whatsoever. I asked him if the Red Army had no control there, and he said no. I asked him if the GPU which at that time was the title of the Soviet secret police, had no control there, and he said they did not, that the Mongolia People's Republic was independent, and that his advice, which he urged me to telegraph at once to President Roosevelt, was that the American Govern- ment should immediately recognize the independence of the Mongolian People's Republic.
This to me was a very extraordinary statement, and I therefore questioned him further on it, and he reiterated what he had said and reiterated his advice that the United States should recognize at once the Mongolian People's Repubhc.
I have said it was an extraordinary statement for several reasons. In the first place. Outer Mongolia, which was ruled at the moment by the so-called Mongolian People's Republic, was under Chinese sovereignty. It was a part of China * * *
On the 12th of March 1936, about a month before Lattimore arrived in Mos- cow, the Soviet Government and the Mongoliarr People's Republic Government, controlled by the GPU, signed a protocol of mutual assistance at Ulan Bator, which is the capital of the so-called Mongolian People's Republic. This was not revealed at the moment, but on March 27, before Mr. Lattimore's arrival in Moscow, there was a news dispatch from Ulan Bator saying that this protocol had been approved by the Little Khiral, which is the legislative institution set up there. On the 2d of April 1936, this protocol was officially communicated to the Chinese Government. On the 7th of April the Chinese Government made the strongest kind of a protest to this infringement on the sovereignty of China. On the 8th of April the Soviet Government through Litvinov replied, "Neither the fact nor the signing of the protocol nor its separate articles violate in the slightest degree the sovereignty of China," et cetera.
Mr. Lattimore therefore at the time when the Soviet Government did not yet dare to come out and say that Outer Mongolia was no longer under Chinese sovereignty, was advocating to me that I should persuade the President of the
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 51
United States to recognize the independence of Outer Mongolia and the cessation of Chinese sovereignty.
I was obliged to conclude that either Mr. Lattimore knew nothing about the subject on which he was supposed to be the leading American expert or that he was deliberately attempting to assist in the spread of Communist authority through Asia (pp. 4522-4525).
Mr. Bogolepov, too, told of a meeting with Mr. Lattimore which happened "in the spring or winter, I guess, of 1936."
Besides my work for. the foreign office, I was also a member of the institute (of world economics and politics) a research worker, and I used to work two or three times a week in the library of this institute. * * * When I was working in this library one of these mornings, a group of people entered the room, the library, headed by Eugene Varga, who was director of the institute. * * *
There were in this group of people some of them which were known to me and some which were unknown to me. Among the people known to me I remember Mr. Abramson, Mr. Kantorovich, and Mr. Kara-Murza. * * *
Varga was a member of the executive committee of the Comintern, the highest body. * * * Kara-Murza was intelligence officer in charge of Mongolian relations. * * * Abramson, as I told you, was a member of the Pacific group of this institute, and at the same time also intelligence officer. * * *
Among them was Mr. Lattimore. And when they entered the room and while talking, they moved toward me, and I was sitting not far from my big map of central Asia, covering Sinkkiang, Mongolia, and a part of Manchuria. Mr. Kara- Murza just returned from a big trip to Mongolia on some other mission. * * *
So the talk started between these people, who went into the room, concerning the Mongolian relations * * *_
My memory retains two topics of conversation: One was discussion of the route through Mongolia from Manchuria, or to Manchuria, I do not remember whether it was discussing the way from the east to the west or vice versa. And while discussing this problem, Kara-Murza, who I mentioned before, observed that showing on this map, this route, saying that "this way is the best one for we are using it always in our relations with the Soviet parts of China."
Mr. Morris. In other words, Kara-Murza pointed out the route to the foreign visitors that they were using to deal with Soviet China.
Mr. Bogolepov. Yes.
Mr. Morris. Was that a secret fact?
Mr. Bogolepov. Certainly it was not revealed anywhere.
Mr. Morris. That was not well known, what route they were using at that time?
Mr. Bogolepov. No; to nobody it was never pubhshed. The nature of our relations with the Soviet region of China were never discussed in the press or anywhere. So I httle bit wondered when I heard such observations in the presence of foreign visitors. Then Kara-Murza got explanations of how the sovietization of Mongolia is progressing, and he described how they are purging the Mon- gofian population from the parasitic class of clergymen.
Mr. Morris They are purging the parasite " class of clergymen from the Mongolian people?
Mr. Bogolepov. Yes. Explaining that our policy there is to get Mongolian people, get them from the feudal state to the communism, passing away this state of capitalism.
Mr. Morris. This is Kara-Murza's explanation to the foreign guests?
Mr. Bogolepov. That is right; yes.
Senator Ferguson. Lattimore, you say, was present at that time?
Mr. Bogoi Epov. He was present.
Mr. Morris. Was he engaging in the conversation?
Mr. Bogoi EPOV. Yes; they talked. But I give you only the summary of the conversation which I remembered, because I couldn't follow each word. By the way, I was not standing by. I was a little two or three desks further. After the the society left the room, I asked Kara-A'urza to remain with me, and who were these people, Comintern people or not, bearing in mind that he told a little bit more than is advisable to tell to the foreign visitors. He said that "No, they are not Comintern, not Comintern people, not quite Comintern people, but that is quite all right with them. * * *
So perhaps 8 months or 9 months in 1937 — 7 or S months, I don't remember — I was reporting on the station of the collegium of the foreign office. Collegium,
52 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
that is the meeting of the foreign commissar and his other commissars, five people in all. This board of commissars is convened twice a week. * * *
The problem was, which I have to report, of getting the so-called popular Republic of Mongolia into the League of Nations. The Soviet Union was very eager to get one voice more in the League of Nations. Mongolia was, just before the Second World War, just one satellite country of the Soviet Union. In the west there was a strong feeling that Mongolia is not an independent country, not a countrj^ at all. And when I reported the information which I received from our delegates to Geneva, then I asked in the meantime, by preparing my own report, the opinion of our Ambassadors in the United States, in Paris, and in London. And, summarizing all these unfavorable reports about the prospective of getting Mongolia as a member of the League of Nations, Litvinov said "Well, the situation is still not ripe. We have to prepare the terrain." * * *
Senator Eastland. You mean you had to prepare public sentiment. *
Mr. BoGOLEPov. That is right. That is what I would like to say. "It is necessary," said Litvinov, "to mobihze the writers and journalists and other people, to describe for the Western World the progress which is achieved in Mon- golian Popular Republic, to say how life is progressing," and so on and so on. This was the first decision which was taken after my report. The second part of decision, the second point, was considering who will make this in different coun- tries, whom we have to charge with this — how do you say, sir?
Senator Eastland. You mean the man who will be placed in charge of mobiliz- ing public sentiment in the west?
Mr. BoGOLEPov, That is right, whom we have tq ask to do the job.
Senator Eastland. Who was that man who was decided upon?
Mr. Bogolepov. Litvinov asked the officer of Mongolian desk of the foreign office, who was present
Mr. Morris. What was his name?
Mr. Bogolepov. Parnoch, P-a-r-n-o-c-h — whom he would recommend, and before Parnoch could give his answer he asked "Lattimore, perhaps?"
Senator Eastland. Litvinov said "Lattimore"?
Mr. Bogolepov. "Lattimore, perhaps"? yes. And Parnoch answered, "Yes, we will try to do that."
Mr. Morris. Was there a formal decision made by that body?
Mr. Bogolepov. There was a formal decision which was obliging for the corresponding bodies of the Soviet foreign group to take measures in order to fulfill the decision (p. 4519).
You have to understand, gentlemen, that there is a big difference between the Soviet foreign office and the State Department, for example, for the role foreign pohcy of the Soviet Union isn't carried by the Soviet foreign office only but through other organizations, first of all through the executive committee of the Comintern, through tlie Soviet secret police, and other oiganizations. * * *
All important suggestions which we make in the foreign office had to be sub- mitted to the so-called political commission of the Politburo. This political commission took the decision and then assigned who was to fulfill, to carry out in life this decision, either the foreign office itself or the secret police, or the Comintern, and so on. And on that particular matter which I am reporting now — I mean, making the people to do some propaganda in our account — that was not the foreign office in charge, but some other oiganization; in the first place, Comin- tern and intelligence.
So all we did, we made our suggestion that the public opinions in the west must be worked out, must be changed in our favor.
And as far as concerns the United States, Litvinov's own suggestion was to put on this business Mr. Owen Lattimore, who was known to us as one of America's outstanding experts on the far-eastern matters. And so this decision was taken. How it was carried out or whether it was carried out, I don't know. * * * _
Mr. SouRwiNE. To put it another way, Mr. Bogolepov, could this decision which was made by the collegium have been a decision merely to seek to hire an independent American writer to do something, or was it in the nature of a decision to send orders to the man who was subject to the orders or instructions of the collegium?
Mr. Bogolepov. But what I mean is that Litvinov proposes somebody to do some kind of business. Evidentlj' he meant that this business will be done. That is what I mean. It was not a question that "we will go to Mr. Lattimore and ask him to be so kind and write this story, and maybe he will say "No."
In my opinion, it was said so short and in such a categorical form that there was no slightest doubt left to me that Mr. Lattimore was the right man who was to take this assignment (pp. 4516-4517).
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 53
The testimony quoted above led to questions regarding Mr. Carter's 1937 message to Mr. Lattimore that MotyHev "is as eager as ever for you to make the trip" to Outer MongoUa.
Mr. Morris. Do you know what the regulations were to foreigners going in to Mongolia?
Mr. BoGOLEPov. The same as for the Soviet citizens — no admission. * * * There is no cases when somebody of the Soviet citizens on private business could go to Mongolia. To Mongolia we send only people in charge of military missions, of intelligence or on party duties, and then only on official business. But no one, private citizen, no scholar, nobody else could go to Mongolia, and certainly no foreigner (p. 4562). * * *
Mr. Morris. Who would make a determination as to whether an individual should go to, say, Mongolia?
Mr. PoppE. It would be NKVD (the Soviet secret police) and the Russian foreign office (p. 2710).
Certam passages regarding Outer MongoHa, which were taken from Mr. Lattimore 's book, Solution in Asia, were put into the record. The book was published in 1945.
In Asia the most important example of the Soviet power of attraction beyond Soviet frontiers is in Outer Mongolia. It is here that we should look for evidence of the kind of attraction that Russia might offer to Korea in the future. Outer Mongolia may be called a satellite of Russia in the good sense. That is to say , the Mongols have gravitated into the Russian orbit of their own accord (and partly out of fear of Japan and China); they have neither been subjected to a military conquest nor sold to the Russians by traitors among their own people. They have gone through their own revolution. They have taken away tlie titles, revenues, and powers of the hereditary princes and aristocrats; but the sons and daughters of these aristocrats are full citizens with full equality of opportunity, including government service.^
Soviet policy in Outer Mongolia cannot be fairly called Red imperialism. It certainly establishes a standard with which other nations must compete if they \yish to practice a policj^ of attraction in Asia. Russo-Mongol relations in Asia, like Russo-Czechoslovak relations in Europe, deserve careful and respectful study. (Source: Solution in Asia, p. 144.)
Finally, Mr. Lattimore himself was questioned about the position he himself had taken in regard to Outer Mongolia.
Question. Did you ever take the position or argue that Outer Mongolia was an independent state free of Russian domination?
Answer. Yes, I think I did, before the war, describe it as free of domination.
Question. You have changed your view since then?
Answer. I think the situation has changed since then.
The Chairman. The question is: Have you changed your view?
Answer. I have changed my view, in line with what I consider to be a changing situation.
Question. When do you think the situation changed? Can you give an approximate date?
Answer. No. I should say some time after the war, if I had been able to get to Outer Mongolia, I might have a more sharp opinion on that, but it is very difficult to determine from outside.
The Chairman. The question is: When do you think the situation changed? If you do not know, you can say so.
Answer. I don't know. Some time after the"war.
Question. When did you first reach the conclusion that Outer Mongolia was an independent state and free of Russian domination? Do you know?
Answer. Some time in the 1930's. * * * j ^^ould roughly characterize the 1920's and 1930's as a period when the close relations between Russia and Outer Mongolia could hardly be described as Russian domination, because it was largely or chiefly at the instance of the Mongol Government itself (p. 4528).
8 Source: Solution in Asia, Owen Lattimore, pp. 141-142, 1945." On page 177 of that book Lattimore writes,
"Finally we should enlarge our acceptance of a freedom bloc in Asia to include Outer Mongolia. We need
take no initiative in identifying outselves either with the Chinese claim that Outer Mongolia is Chinese
territory or with the Russian policy of recognizing Outer Mongolia as independent. The important facts
or us are that Outer Mongolia has long been independent in fact and * * *."
54 institute of pacific relations
The IPR Future of Austern, Mitchell, Moore, Barnes,
Lattimore, and Carter
What part in IPR's future was played by those who either visited Moscow or